Order adopting the Findings, Conclusions, and Recommendation (Dkt. 54); diagnosis terms blacked out on this copy¶

Bass v. TTUHSC, No. 5:25-cv-00244-H-BV (N.D. Tex.) · Dkt. 60 · 2026-09-23 · PDF

Text extracted from the PDF; scanned pages were read by OCR. The PDF is the authoritative copy.

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
LUBBOCK DIVISION
KEVIN N. BASS,
Plaintiff,
v.

No. 5:25-CV-244-H

TEXAS TECH UNIVERSITY HEALTH
SCIENCES CENTER, et al.,
Defendants.
ORDER ADOPTING FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS,
AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE MAGISTRATE
JUDGE AND OVERRULING THE PLAINTIFF’S OBJECTIONS
Before the Court are the Findings, Conclusions, and Recommendations (FCR) of
United States Magistrate Judge Amanda ‘Amy’ R. Burch (Dkt. No. 54). Judge Burch
recommends granting the defendants’ motion to dismiss all claims (Dkt. No. 27) and
denying the plaintiff’s motion for leave to file a second amended complaint (Dkt. No. 43).
The plaintiff, Kevin N. Bass, timely filed objections (Dkt. No. 56).1
The Court overrules the objections and adopts the FCR in full. Even viewing the
operative complaint and proposed amended complaint in a light most favorable to Bass, he
has failed to state claims upon which relief can be granted. Moreover, his proposed
amendments do not cure the defects in his claims, rendering them futile. Accordingly, the
Court grants the defendants’ motion to dismiss (Dkt. No. 27) and denies the plaintiff’s
motion for leave to file a second amended complaint (Dkt. No. 43).

1

Bass filed another motion for leave to file a new proposed amended complaint concurrent with his
objections to the FCR. See Dkt. No. 57. The Court will resolve this motion in a separate order.

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Factual Allegations and Procedural History
A.

Factual Allegations2

In 2023, Bass was a medical student at Texas Tech University Health Sciences
Center (TTUHSC). Dkt. No. 14 at 7. During his time as a medical student, TTUHSC
faculty and staff filed complaints about Bass’s conduct. See id. at 10–11. Dr. Jennifer
Wilson, TTUHSC Vice Dean for Medical Education, filed “multiple professionalism
complaints” against Bass and “failed [him] on his pediatrics clerkship without a clear
academic basis.” Id. at 10. Another TTUHSC employee, Assistant Vice Dean for Student
Affairs, Rachel Forbes, “filed or prompted” multiple “physical threat and professionalism
complaints” against Bass. Id. at 11. Moreover, Bass filed six grievances against TTUHSC
faculty and staff “for learner mistreatment.” Id.
Also during medical school, Bass regularly posted on social media and commented
“on scientific, medical, and social issues,” including criticizing COVID-19 policies, which
drew “backlash and reputational pressure.” Id. at 9. Bass contends that, at the time of the
events that form the basis of his suit, TTUHSC was aware of Bass’s social media presence
and the “controversy surrounding his posts.” Id.
On November 3, Bass made a social media post that he describes as “a short[,]
philosophical reflection on mortality that did not name TTUHSC, identify any person, or
call for or threaten violence.” Id. at 8. Certain faculty and staff at TTUHSC reported that
the post caused them to fear for their personal safety, prompting TTUHSC to assess any
potential threat. See id. (referencing TTUHSC’s “Threat Assessment and Interim

2

The factual allegations are taken from Bass’s first amended complaint (Dkt. No. 14), which the
Court accepts as true when resolving a motion to dismiss. See Villarreal v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.,
814 F.3d 763, 766 (5th Cir. 2016).

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Suspension paperwork” and stating that the TTUHSC Student Conduct Board found the
post “disruptive and reasonably perceived as a potential threat to members of the TTUHSC
community”).
Following the post, TTUHSC initiated disciplinary proceedings and issued an
“Emergency Removal” and “Criminal Trespass Warning” to Bass that prohibited him from
being on campus during the investigation. Id. at 10. TTHUSC issued a campus-wide
“BOLO” message that urged facilities’ staff to be on the lookout for Bass. See id. at 9. Bass
contends this ban reached beyond TTUHSC facilities. Id. at 10 (alleging that, on November
4, the Assistant Vice Dean for Student Affairs emailed “non-TTUHSC clinical-affiliate
personnel” and directed them not to allow Bass at Covenant Medical Center facilities).
TTHUSC scheduled a disciplinary hearing on Monday, December 11, 2023. See id.
at 6. Bass asserts that the Student Conduct Administrator, Dr. David Trotter, told Bass
that, at the hearing, the Board3 would first “hear and decide” the six grievances Bass had
lodged against TTUHSC. Id. at 7; 11. Trotter stated that only after Bass’s grievances were
decided would the Board consider the complaints about Bass’s conduct. Id. at 7. Bass
prepared for the hearing “in reliance on this promised format.” Id. Additionally, Trotter
told Bass that he could resolve the disciplinary investigation by withdrawing from TTUHSC
with no possibility of re-enrollment, but Bass refused. Id.
Prior to the hearing, Bass and his counsel notified TTHUSC’s Student Disability
Services (SDS) that he had a “

3

disability

” and

Bass elsewhere identifies the Student Conduct Board as the entity that “unanimously
recommended [his] non-academic dismissal” from TTUHSC. See Dkt. No. 14 at 12. Thus, the
Court takes Bass’s references to “the Board” to mean the Student Conduct Board. This Board
comprised the Associate Dean of Admissions, Dr. Felix Morales; two faculty physicians; and two
fourth-year medical students. Id.

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submitted a neuropsychological evaluation. Id. at 6. On December 8, he “called SDS to
initiate accommodations” and requested a Letter of Accommodation that would ensure
“communication supports” at the hearing—set to occur in less than one business day from
the time of the request—“including limited attorney-assisted questioning to cue/clarify.” Id.
An attorney and “outside Hearing Officer,” Darren Gibson, conducted the hearing
on December 11. Id. at 5. The hearing lasted approximately 14 hours, and 11 witnesses,
including Bass, provided testimony. Id. at 7. However, the hearing did not follow the
format promised by Trotter and, instead, “TTUHSC . . . stacked hours of adverse testimony
and conduct allegations before allowing any meaningful opportunity for [Bass] to present
his grievances or a coherent response.” Id.
Bass contends that Gibson “lacked neutrality and operated under constraints that
materially favored the administration.” Id. Gibson “acknowledged the SDS process on the
record,” admitted a redacted version of Bass’s neuropsychological evaluation “excluding the
accommodations section” as outside of the hearing’s scope, and barred Bass’s counsel from
directly questioning witnesses. Id. Bass asserts that Gibson violated the rules governing the
hearing because he “barred contemporaneous objections; required counsel’s questions to be
submitted in writing; . . . limit[ed] [Bass’s] questioning for ‘relevance’; and applied time
limits and sequencing asymmetrically against [Bass].” Id. Additionally, Gibson “denied
requested separate hearings; restricted defense witnesses; [and] accepted late/redacted
evidence favorable to [TTUHSC] while excluding comparable . . . evidence” submitted by
Bass. Id. at 8, 11.
After the hearing, the Board unanimously recommended Bass’s non-academic
dismissal from TTUHSC School of Medicine. Id. at 12. Bass’s transcript now includes the

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notation “Administrative Dismissal Effective 01112024,” which has caused third parties to
deny him certain unidentified opportunities. Id. at 11. Bass maintains that, in connection
with his dismissal, Forbes sent a class-wide email broadcasting his dismissal and directing
his classmates to check Bass’s social media. Id. Additionally, all six of Bass’s grievances
“were reviewed and rejected by four different administrators” because they lacked evidence
or violated TTUHSC policies. Id.
B.

Procedural History

Bass, proceeding pro se, filed suit in November 2025 and amended his complaint
shortly thereafter. Dkt. Nos. 1; 14. Bass sues TTUHSC and several of its employees in their
official capacities—Amanda McSween, the registrar; Dr. Lauren Cobbs, Senior Associate
Dean for Student Affairs; Dr. Simon Williams, Senior Associate Dean for Academic
Affairs; Tamara Mancini, Director of Student Disability Services; Mia Myers, Associate
Managing Director of Student Financial Aid; Dr. Lori Rice-Spearman, President; Dr.
Darrin D’Agostino, Chief Academic Officer; and an unidentified “TTUHSC ADA Title II
Coordinator.” Dkt. No. 14 at 1–2. Additionally, Bass sues multiple people in their
individual capacities, including Darren Gibson, the hearing officer who presided at Bass’s
disciplinary hearing; Dr. Jennifer Wilson, Vice Dean for Medical Education, TTUHSC
Covenant Branch Campus; Rachel Forbes, Assistant Vice Dean for Student Affairs,
TTUHSC Covenant Branch Campus; and “DOES 2–10,” who represent “unidentified
TTUHSC officials who participated in the events” alleged in Bass’s complaint. Id. at 2, 5–6.
In the amended complaint Bass asserts violations of: (1) Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (RA) by TTUHSC; (2) the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA) by the unidentified ADA coordinator, McSween, Cobbs, Williams, Mancini, Myers,

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Rice-Spearman, and D’Agostino in their official capacities; (3) Bass’s Fourteenth
Amendment procedural due process rights by Cobbs, Williams, Gibson, and DOES 2–10 in
their individual capacities; (4) Bass’s Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest by McSween,
Forbes, and DOES 2–10 in their individual capacities; and (5) Bass’s First Amendment
free-speech rights by Cobbs, Williams, Gibson, Wilson, Forbes, and DOES 2–10 in their
official capacities. Id. at 13–18. Bass seeks monetary damages as well as injunctive4 and
declaratory relief. Id. at 19–20.
The defendants move to dismiss all claims pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(1) and (6) and assert sovereign and qualified immunity. Dkt. No. 27. The
motion is fully briefed, and all parties ask the court to consider materials outside of the
pleadings when resolving the motion. See Dkt. Nos. 27; 27-1 to 27-12; 33; 33-1; 33-2; 38.
Additionally, Bass seeks leave to file a second amended complaint. Dkt. No. 43.5 The
defendants responded, and Bass replied. Dkt. Nos. 48; 49. Both motions are ripe for
review.
On July 14, 2026, Judge Burch issued her FCR in which she recommends that the
Court dismiss Bass’s ADA claims and claim for declaratory relief without prejudice and
dismiss all other claims with prejudice. Dkt. No. 54 at 56. Additionally, Judge Burch
recommends that the Court deny Bass leave to amend because the proposed amendments
would be futile. Id. Bass timely filed objections to the FCR. Dkt. No. 56.

4

Bass originally sought a preliminary injunction, Dkt. No. 14 at 18–19, but subsequently withdrew
this request, Dkt. No. 24 at 1. Accordingly, the Court denied the motion for a preliminary
injunction as moot. Dkt. No. 28.

5

Upon Bass filing this second motion for leave to amend on March 31, 2026, Judge Burch denied
the first motion for leave to amend (Dkt. No. 26) as moot and evaluated the more recent motion
for leave to amend (Dkt. No. 43) in connection with the motion to dismiss. Dkt. No. 55.

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Legal Standard for Objections
A party who disputes any part of a Magistrate Judge’s FCR must file specific written

objections within 14 days after being served with a copy. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R.
Civ. P. 72(b)(2). As for portions where no specific objections are filed within the 14-day
period, the Court reviews the Magistrate Judge’s findings, conclusions, and
recommendations only for plain error. Serrano v. Customs & Border Patrol, U.S. Customs &
Border Prot., 975 F.3d 488, 502 (5th Cir. 2020).
When a party files objections, the Court must review those objected-to portions de
novo. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Kreimerman v. Casa Veerkamp, S.A. de C.V., 22 F.3d 634, 646
(5th Cir. 1994). The district court may then accept, reject, or modify the recommendations
or findings, in whole or in part. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3). Objections to the FCR must be
“specific”; they must “put the district court on notice of the urged error.” Williams v. K&B
Equip. Co., 724 F.2d 508, 511 (5th Cir. 1984). “[A]n objection must identify the specific
finding or recommendation to which objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and
specify the place in the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation where the disputed
determination is found.” Thompson v. Bumpas, No. 4:22-CV-640, 2022 WL 17585271, at *1
(N.D. Tex. Dec. 12, 2022) (citing United States v. Mathis, 458 F. Supp. 3d 559, 564 (E.D.
Tex. 2020)).
The district court need not consider “[f]rivolous, conclusive[,] or general objections.”
See Battle v. U.S. Parole Comm’n, 834 F.2d 419, 421 (5th Cir. 1987) (quoting Nettles v.
Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404, 410 n.8 (5th Cir. 1982) (en banc)). Moreover, “[i]t is well settled
that issues raised for the first time in objections to a magistrate judge’s report are deemed
not properly before the district court.” K Invs., Inc. v. B-Gas Ltd., No. 21-40642, 2022 WL

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964210, at *5 (5th Cir. Mar. 30, 2022) (first citing Cupit v. Whitley, 28 F.3d 532, 535–36 n.5
(5th Cir. 1994); then citing United States v. Armstrong, 951 F.2d 626, 630 (5th Cir. 1992); and
then citing Harrison v. Smith, 83 F. App’x 630, 632 (5th Cir. 2003)).
3.

Analysis
The Court overrules Bass’s objections and adopts the FCR in full. Therefore, the

Court grants the defendants’ motion to dismiss and denies the plaintiff’s motion for leave to
file a second amended complaint.
A.

The Court finds no plain error in the unobjected-to portions of the FCR
and adopts those portions of the FCR.

Magistrate Judge Burch first concluded that the materials outside of the pleadings
that the parties cited in their motion-to-dismiss briefing were not attached to the first
amended complaint or central to Bass’s claims. Dkt. No. 54 at 8–10. Thus, Judge Burch
declined to consider these materials when evaluating the motion to dismiss. See id. Judge
Burch also found that TTUHSC was not entitled to sovereign immunity from claims under
the Rehabilitation Act. Id. at 11 n.3.
Bass does not object to the exclusion of materials outside of the pleadings.
Additionally, as explained infra Analysis 3.B.ii.a, Bass does not object to dismissal of any
RA disability-discrimination claim. Nor does he object to dismissal of his request for
declaratory relief pursuant to his RA claim. See Dkt. No. 54 at 21. The Court has reviewed
all unobjected-to portions of the FCR for plain error. Finding none, the Court accepts and
adopts all unobjected-to portions of the FCR.

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B.

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The Court overrules Bass’s objections and grants the defendants’ motion to
dismiss.

The defendants seek dismissal of all claims pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) and (6),
asserting that TTUHSC and the official-capacity defendants are entitled to sovereign
immunity, the individual defendants are entitled to qualified immunity, and, apart from the
immunity defenses, Bass has also failed to state claims upon which relief can be granted.
The Court agrees that Bass’s claims fail at the pleading stage, overrules his objections, and
grants the defendants’ motion to dismiss.
i.

Motion to Dismiss Legal Standards
a. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1)

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) allows a party to challenge the
subject-matter jurisdiction of the district court to hear a case. “A case is properly dismissed
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction when the court lacks the statutory or constitutional
power to adjudicate the case.” Krim v. pcOrder.com, Inc., 402 F.3d 489, 494 (5th Cir. 2005)
(quoting Home Builders Ass’n of Miss., Inc. v. City of Madison, 143 F.3d 1006, 1010 (5th Cir.
1998)). Claims barred by sovereign immunity are properly dismissed under Rule 12(b)(1)
for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Warnock v. Pecos Cnty., 88 F.3d 341, 343 (5th Cir.
1996). “[T]he plaintiff constantly bears the burden of proof that jurisdiction does in fact
exist.” Ramming v. United States, 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 2001).
Lack of subject-matter jurisdiction may be found by considering: “(1) the complaint
alone; (2) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts evidenced in the record; or
(3) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts plus the court’s resolution of disputed
facts.” King v. U.S. Dep’t of Veteran Affs., 728 F.3d 410, 413 (5th Cir. 2013) (quoting
Ramming, 281 F.3d at 161). Therefore, “[i]n considering a challenge to subject matter

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jurisdiction, the district court is ‘free to weigh the evidence and resolve factual disputes in
order to satisfy itself that it has the power to hear the case.’” Smith v. Reg’l Transit Auth., 756
F.3d 340, 347 (5th Cir. 2014) (quoting Krim, 402 F.3d at 494).
b. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)
“To survive a [Rule 12(b)(6)] motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient
factual matter which, when taken as true, states ‘a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.’” Innova Hosp. S. A., Ltd. P’ship v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ga., Inc., 892 F.3d 719, 726
(5th Cir. 2018) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). In other
words, the plaintiff must plead facts “that allow[] the court to draw the reasonable inference
that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009). “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for
more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. (quoting Twombly,
550 U.S. at 556). If a complaint pleads facts that are “‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s
liability, it ‘stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to
relief.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).
In resolving a motion to dismiss, a court must “accept all well-pleaded facts as true
and view those facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Richardson v. Axion Logistics,
LLC, 780 F.3d 304, 306 (5th Cir. 2015) (cleaned up) (quoting Bustos v. Martini Club, Inc., 599
F.3d 458, 461 (5th Cir. 2010)). But a court should not “accept as true conclusory
allegations, unwarranted factual inferences, or legal conclusions.” Gentilello v. Rege, 627
F.3d 540, 544 (5th Cir. 2010) (quoting Plotkin v. IP Axess Inc., 407 F.3d 690, 696 (5th Cir.
2005)). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere
conclusory statements, do not suffice” to state a plausible claim to relief. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at

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678. “When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity
and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Id. at 679.
In considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, “a district court must limit itself to the
contents of the pleadings, including attachments thereto.” Collins v. Morgan Stanley Dean
Witter, 224 F.3d 496, 498 (5th Cir. 2000). If a court is presented with and does not exclude
matters outside the pleadings, it must convert the motion to a motion for summary
judgment under Rule 56. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d). However, a district court may consider
certain information outside of the pleadings without converting the motion “if that evidence
is either (a) a document attached to the Rule 12(b)(6) motion, referred to in the complaint,
and central to the plaintiff's claim; or (b) a matter subject to judicial notice under Federal
Rule of Evidence 201.” George v. SI Grp., Inc., 36 F.4th 611, 619 (5th Cir. 2022).
ii.

The Court concludes that Bass has not sufficiently stated a
Rehabilitation Act claim.

Bass alleges RA claims against TTUHSC for failure to accommodate, retaliation,
and interference, as well as related requests for compensatory and nominal damages and
declaratory relief. For the following reasons, the Court dismisses Bass’s RA claims.
a.

Failure-to-accommodate Claim

As a threshold matter, the Court agrees that Bass’s complaint is not clear as to
whether he is asserting a disability-discrimination claim, a failure-to-accommodate claim, or
both. See Dkt. No. 54 at 11 (citing Dkt. No. 14 at 13). Bass indicates in his objections that
he intends to proceed “expressly on the accommodation theory.” Dkt. No. 56-1 at 11.
Accordingly, the Court evaluates Bass’s objections with respect to a failure-to-accommodate
RA claim.

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“[A] plaintiff must prove the following . . . elements to prevail in a failure-toaccommodate claim: (1) the plaintiff is a ‘qualified individual with a disability;’ (2) the
disability and its consequential limitations were ‘known’ by the covered employer; and
(3) the employer failed to make ‘reasonable accommodations’ for such known limitations.”
Amedee v. Shell Chem., LP, 953 F.3d 831, 837 (5th Cir. 2020) (quoting Feist v. La., Dep’t of
Justice, Off. of the Att’y Gen., 730 F.3d 450, 452 (5th Cir. 2013)).6 Judge Burch concluded that
Bass failed to plead facts that, if true, sufficiently alleged elements two and three of a
failure-to-accommodate claim. Dkt. No. 54 at 15–19.
Bass first asserts that Judge Burch stated that a failure-to-accommodate claim does
not require a plaintiff to prove that a disability was the sole cause of the discrimination, but
then concluded his failure-to-accommodate claim failed on this basis. See Dkt. No. 56-1 at
11. This is an incorrect reading of the FCR, which includes a discussion of whether Bass’s
asserted disability was the sole cause of the alleged discrimination, but limits that discussion
to Bass’s purported disability-discrimination claim—not his failure-to-accommodate claim.
See Dkt. No. 54 at 13–15. As to Bass’s failure-to-accommodate claim, Judge Burch
concluded that Bass had not sufficiently pled elements two and three—that TTUHSC knew
of the disability and failed to make a reasonable accommodation. Id. at 16–19. Thus, the
Court overrules Bass’s objection that “[t]he FCR’s causation reasoning” as applied to any
disability-discrimination claim “conflicts with its own footnote 4” because Judge Burch did
not apply the sole-cause theory to Bass’s failure-to-accommodate claim. Dkt. No. 56-1 at
11; see also Dkt. No. 54 at 15–19.

6

In analyzing the RA failure-to-accommodate claim, the Court may consult authorities that evaluate
both the RA and ADA because “[j]urisprudence interpreting either section is applicable to both.”
Hainze v. Richards, 207 F.3d 795, 799 (5th Cir. 2000).

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Next, Bass objects that Judge Burch improperly concluded that he lacked meaningful
access to the disciplinary hearing. Dkt. No. 56-1 at 11–12. Again, Bass misstates the FCR.
Judge Burch concluded that Bass has not alleged denial of access “solely by reason of his
disability” because Bass asserts various other reasons for such purported denial. Dkt. No.
54 at 13–15. Accordingly, assuming without deciding that Bass was denied meaningful
access to the hearing, Judge Burch’s conclusion that Bass failed to allege that his disability
was the sole cause of such denial remains undisturbed. In any event, this analysis pertained
to a disability-discrimination claim—a theory Bass has affirmatively abandoned. See Dkt.
Nos. 56-1 at 11; 54 at 13–15. Thus, the Court overrules this objection.
Bass next objects to Judge Burch’s conclusion that he failed to plead element three of
his claim because TTUHSC provided the preferred accommodation at the hearing. Dkt.
No. 56-1 at 12. Judge Burch observed that Bass “does not explain what his requested
accommodation” of “limited attorney-assisted questioning to cue/clarify” “even means.”
Dkt. No. 54 at 15–16. She then concluded that “it appears TTUHSC provided the preferred
accommodation” at the hearing by allowing Bass’s attorney to submit written questions to
witnesses and permitting the attorney to assist with Bass’s direct questioning of witnesses.
Id. at 16. Bass argues that this conclusion contradicts the allegation in his complaint that
Gibson, the hearing officer, barred Bass’s counsel from “questioning witnesses directly even
as a communication aid.” Dkt. No. 56-1 at 12 (quoting Dkt. No. 54 at 4); see also Dkt. No.
14 at 7. The Court does not see such contradiction. Gibson’s disallowance of direct
questioning by Bass’s attorney does not mean that allowing Bass’s attorney to assist Bass in
his own direct questioning as a communication aid was not a reasonable accommodation.

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Even if Bass has properly pled that he was denied a reasonable accommodation by
disallowing direct questioning by his attorney, his claim still fails because he did not
sufficiently plead element two—that “the disability and its consequential limitations were
‘known.’” Amedee, 953 F.3d at 837 (quoting Feist, 730 F.3d at 452). Judge Burch concluded
that Bass failed to plead facts that show he advised TTUHSC of his disability’s alleged
limitations. Dkt. No. 54 at 17. In objecting to this conclusion, Bass relies only on materials
outside of the pleadings—materials that Judge Burch declined to consider and this Court
likewise declines to consider. See Dkt. No. 56-1 at 14; see also supra Analysis § 3.A; Dkt. No.
54 at 8–10. Because Bass has not pointed to factual allegations in his complaint that
TTUHSC had knowledge of his disability’s limitations, he has failed to sufficiently plead
element two of his failure-to-accommodate claim. This objection is overruled.
Therefore, Bass has failed to sufficiently plead elements two and three of his RA
failure-to-accommodate claim. The Court overrules his objections, adopts the FCR’s
recommendation, and dismisses this claim.
b. Intentional-Discrimination Claim
Bass next objects to Judge Burch’s conclusion that his claims for compensatory and
nominal damages should be dismissed because he has not pled that TTUHSC intentionally
discriminated against him. See Dkt. No. 56-1 at 15–16. Again, Bass cites matters outside of
his live pleading—namely, his proposed amended complaint—which the Court does not
consider when evaluating his objections. See supra, Analysis § 3.A; Goodson v. City of Dall.,
3:25-CV-816, 2025 WL 1397538, at *1 (N.D. Tex. May 14, 2025) (stating that the
magistrate judge properly evaluated the live complaint and not the proposed amended
complaint when issuing an FCR).

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But even if the Court were to consider the allegations in the proposed amended
complaint, Bass does not allege facts that, when viewed in a light most favorable to him,
state a claim for intentional discrimination by TTUHSC. A showing of intentional
discrimination requires the plaintiff to allege “that the defendant at least ha[d] actual
notice.” Smith v. Harris Cnty., 956 F.3d 311, 318 (5th Cir. 2020) (quoting Miraglia v. Bd. of
Supervisors of La. State Museum, 901 F.3d 565, 575 (5th Cir. 2018)). Bass alleges that the
hearing officer, Gibson, declined to present his requested accommodations to the Board for
consideration. Dkt. No. 56-2 at 10. More specifically, Gibson convened with Bass’s
counsel and TTUHSC’s general counsel during the disciplinary hearing and then made the
decision about which of the requested accommodations would be allowed. Id. And as
Judge Burch correctly notes, “Bass’s requests for accommodation at the hearing to officials
unaffiliated with the ADA office—i.e., SDS—does not impute knowledge to TTUHSC.”
Dkt. No. 54 at 19 (citing Pickett v. Tex. Tech Univ. Health Scis. Ctr., 37 F.4th 1013, 1033 (5th
Cir. 2022)).
Additionally, Bass objects that the FCR “does not address” the holding in a recent
Supreme Court decision, A. J. T. ex rel. A. T. v. Osseo Area Schs., Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 279, 605
U.S. 335 (2025). Dkt. No. 56-1 at 16. Foremost, the Court need not consider such
nonspecific objections. Even so, this holding does not disturb the FCR. A. J. T. states that
“ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims based on educational services should be subject to the
same standards that apply in other disability[-]discrimination contexts.” A. J. T., 605 U.S.
at 345. “After A. J. T., ‘the appropriate standard for Section 504 claims is deliberate
indifference’—nothing more and nothing less.” Mendoza v. Amarillo Indep. Sch. Dist.,
No. 2:24-CV-169, 2026 WL 1834784, at *5 (N.D. Tex. June 25, 2026) (quoting W.H. ex rel.

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Larry G. v. Fort Bend Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 4:24-CV-1515, 2025 WL 2147067, at *20 (S.D.
Tex. July 29, 2025)). But this is the standard for stating an RA claim—not the standard for
recovering compensatory and nominal damages, which requires a showing of intentional
discrimination. See Francois v. Our Lady of the Lake Hosp., Inc., 8 F.4th 370, 379 (5th Cir.
2021) (requiring a showing of intentional discrimination to recover nominal damages in an
RA disability-discrimination claim); Harris Cnty., 956 F.3d at 318 (“Even when plaintiffs
successfully prove a disability-discrimination or a failure-to-accommodate claim, they may
only recover compensatory damages upon a showing of intentional discrimination.”
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). This objection is also overruled.
Accordingly, the Court dismisses Bass’s request for nominal and compensatory
damages for failure to plead facts of intentional discrimination.
c. Retaliation and Interference Claims
Next, Bass objects to the dismissal of his RA retaliation and interference claims.
Dkt. No. 56-1 at 16–18. Bass again attempts to cure any deficiencies in these claims by
pointing to newly pled allegations in his proposed amended complaint, and, again, the
Court declines to consider allegations outside of the operative pleading. Because this is the
only basis on which Bass objects to the dismissal of his RA interference claim, the Court
overrules the objection and dismisses this claim.
With respect to an RA retaliation claim, Bass also objects to Judge Burch’s
conclusion that he failed to plead facts sufficient to establish a causal link between
requesting accommodations and denial of those accommodations at the hearing. To
establish a prima facie cause for retaliation, Bass must plead facts that show “(1) [he]
engaged in an activity protected by the Rehabilitation Act; (2) [TTUHSC] took an adverse

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employment action against him; and (3) a casual connection existed between the adverse
employment action and the protected activity.” Grodman v. Tex. Tech Univ. Health Scis. Ctr.,
816 F. Supp. 3d 602, 622 (N.D. Tex. 2025) (citing Calderon v. Potter, 113 F. App’x 586, 592
(5th Cir. 2004)).
Bass asserts that the temporal proximity between the two events—approximately
three days—“supports a causal inference.” Dkt. No. 56-1 at 17. As this Court has stated
previously when evaluating an RA retaliation claim,
[a]lthough it is not dispositive, Mooney v. Lafayette Cnty. Sch. Dist., 538 F. App’x
447, 454 (5th Cir. 2013), temporal proximity between the protected activity and
the adverse . . . action is often used to establish the [causal] connection for the
prima facie case of retaliation. See, e.g., Milteer v. Navarro County, 652 F. Supp.
3d 754, 766–67 (N.D. Tex. 2023). Typically, for a plaintiff to meet his initial
burden based on temporal proximity, the protected activity and adverse action
must be ‘very close’ in time. See [Lyons v. Katy Indep. Sch. Dist., 964 F.3d 298,
305 (5th Cir. 2020)] (quoting Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 273,
121 S.Ct. 1508, 149 L.Ed.2d 509 (2001)).
Grodman, 816 F. Supp. 3d at 622. Here, a span of approximately three days is so close that
the Court determines Bass has alleged facts that, when viewed in a light most favorable to
him, plausibly allege the causation element of his RA retaliation claim. Even so, this alone
does not save his claim.
Bass pleads retaliation by TTUHSC and the “official capacity” defendants. Bass
asserts that Gibson, acting on behalf of TTUHSC, disallowed certain evidence at the
disciplinary hearing in retaliation for Bass’s eleventh-hour accommodation request to SDS
the Friday before the hearing. In his objections, Bass more specifically identifies the
retaliatory conduct as: “the hearing officer excluded the accommodation documentation,
redacted its recommendations specifically, and barred the evaluator from testifying.” Dkt.
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But even assuming Gibson had knowledge of Bass’s report to SDS and engaged in
this conduct as retaliation for that protected activity, disallowance of this documentation
and testimony must qualify as a materially adverse action to state a retaliation claim. See
Jeudy v. Hous. Cmty. Coll., No. 4:23-CV-2758, 2026 WL 675683, at *4 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 2,
2026). A materially adverse action is one that would dissuade a reasonable person from
engaging in the protected activity—in this instance, requesting accommodations. See Stewart
v. Miss. Transp. Comm’n, 586 F.3d 321, 331 (5th Cir. 2009) (citing Burlington N. & Santa Fe
Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68 (2006)). “The purpose of this objective standard is ‘to
separate significant from trivial harms’ . . . .” Id. (quoting Burlington Northern, 548 U.S. at
68)).
Here, the Court concludes that Bass does not allege a materially adverse action. Bass
does not allege that Gibson excluded the neuropsychological evaluation that recommended
communication supports altogether or denied all requested accommodations. Rather, Bass
alleges that Gibson admitted a redacted version of the evaluation that eliminated
information and testimony that Gibson found “outside the Board’s scope.” Dkt. No. 14 at
6–7. And it is undisputed that Gibson granted certain accommodations at the hearing, such
as allowing Bass’s counsel to submit written questions and assist Bass in questioning
witnesses. See id.; see also Dkt. No. 54 at 16. That the hearing officer made decisions about
evidence that Bass found harmful to his request for certain accommodations, yet allowed
other accommodations, is not a materially adverse action that would prevent a reasonable
student from requesting accommodations at a disciplinary hearing. Cf. Strife v. Aldine Indep.
Sch. Dist., 138 F.4th 237, 250 (5th Cir. 2025) (quoting EEOC v. Agro Distrib., LLC, 555 F.3d
462, 471 (5th Cir. 2009) (“The ADA provides a right to reasonable accommodation, not to

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the employee’s preferred accommodation.”). Thus, even if the temporal proximity is
enough to satisfy the causation element at the pleading stage, Bass’s failure to allege an
adverse action is fatal to his RA retaliation claim.
In sum, the Court overrules Bass’s objections and dismisses his RA claims for
failure to accommodate, interference, and retaliation, and his related requests for
compensatory and nominal damages.
iii.

The Court concludes that the individual defendants are entitled to
qualified immunity from Bass’s Section 1983 claims.

Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Bass alleges Fourteenth Amendment procedural due
process and “stigma-plus” claims and a First Amendment retaliation claim against the
individual defendants. The Court agrees with the FCR’s conclusion that the individual
defendants are entitled to qualified immunity from these claims.
a.

Qualified Immunity Legal Standard

“Government officials are entitled to immunity from § 1983 suits for damages arising
from their duties unless the plaintiff can show ‘(1) that the [official] violated a federal
statutory or constitutional right and (2) that the unlawfulness of the conduct was clearly
established at the time.’” Hughes v. Garcia, 100 F.4th 611, 618 (5th Cir. 2024) (citation
modified) (quoting Ramirez v. Escajeda, 921 F.3d 497, 500 (5th Cir. 2019)). When a
defendant asserts qualified immunity, district courts “have discretion to decide which prong
of the qualified-immunity analysis to address first.” Morgan v. Swanson, 659 F.3d 359, 371
(5th Cir. 2011) (citing Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009)). In brief, qualified
immunity “provides ample protection to all but the plainly incompetent or those who
knowingly violate the law.” Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986); see also Hughes, 100
F.4th at 618 (quoting Malley, 475 U.S. at 341).

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“[G]overnment officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded
from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow
v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982); see also Savage v. Westcott, 152 F.4th 687, 691 (5th Cir.
2025). Accordingly, “[q]ualified immunity protects against novel theories of statutory or
Constitutional injury.” Mendenhall v. Riser, 213 F.3d 226, 230 (5th Cir. 2000). “[A]ny
purported harm must stem from rights clearly established under law at the time of the
incident, and the contours of that right must be sufficiently clear such that a reasonable
[official] would understand that his actions were violative of the right at issue.” Id.
b.

Procedural Due Process Claim

Judge Burch concluded that Bass did not allege a violation of his due process rights
and, even if he had, the individual defendants are entitled to qualified immunity because it
was not clearly established that the defendants’ conduct was unconstitutional. Dkt. No. 54
at 31–40. Even assuming Bass could allege a procedural due process violation, the Court
agrees that any such constitutional right was not clearly established at the time of the alleged
conduct.7
As a procedural matter, Bass first contends that the Court cannot dismiss a claim on
the basis of qualified immunity without allowing him to file a reply under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 7. Dkt. No. 56-1 at 22–23. Bass again misunderstands the applicable law
and procedural posture of the case. By Rule 7’s plain language, a reply to an answer is only

7

Because the Court finds the plaintiff’s objections to the FCR’s qualified-immunity determination
meritless and agrees that the individual defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on the
procedural due process claim, it need not reach the plaintiff’s objections to the determination that
he did not sufficiently allege a due process violation.

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required if a court orders a plaintiff to submit one. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 7(a)(7). Here, the
parties have each briefed the issue of qualified immunity in the motion to dismiss, response,
and reply, see Dkt. Nos. 27; 33; 38, and a Rule 7 reply to the defendants’ assertion of
qualified immunity is neither necessary nor warranted. This objection is overruled.
Bass next contends that the alleged procedural due process violation was clearly
established at the time of the violation. More specifically, he contends that it was clearly
established that “a student facing expulsion may not be denied all defense witnesses while
the prosecuting institution presents ten, or that the institution’s paid advocate may not write
the tribunal’s decision.” Dkt. No. 56-1 at 23. As the FCR correctly notes, Bass only alleges
that Gibson excluded two witnesses—his neuropsychologist and Dr. Trotter—both of
whom Bass contends were offering testimony on matters other than the conduct violations
asserted against him. See Dkt. No. 54 at 35–36 (citing Dkt. No. 14 at 6–8, 12). And Bass
alleges that he was able to offer his own testimony. Dkt. No. 14 at 7. Thus, his contention
that there was a “complete denial of defense witnesses,” Dkt. No. 56-1 at 23, is
disingenuous. Bass was able to testify on his own behalf and does not allege that he
attempted to present other witnesses in defense of the misconduct allegations. Moreover, he
does not allege in the operative pleading that Gibson authored the letter from the Board
with the decision to dismiss him from TTUHSC. Rather, this allegation appears in his
objections and proposed pleadings, which are not properly before the Court.
But even so, Bass fails to identify any authority that shows such violations were
clearly established. He makes the conclusory assertion that such violations were “obvious
applications of Dixon and Withrow,” Dkt. No. 56-1 at 23, which the Court takes to mean
Dixon v. Ala. State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1961), and Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S.

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35 (1975). While these cases generally stand for the proposition that students facing possible
expulsion are entitled to notice and an opportunity to be heard by an unbiased
decisionmaker, neither provides “adequate authority at a sufficiently high level of specificity
to put a reasonable official on notice that his conduct is definitively unlawful.” Babinski v.
Sosnowsky, 79 F.4th 515, 520 (5th Cir. 2023) (quoting Walsh v. Hodge, 975 F.3d 475, 485–86
(5th Cir. 2020)). That is, even assuming Bass’s allegations are true, neither case puts the
defendants on notice that disallowing witnesses who are not testifying about the misconduct
at issue in a disciplinary hearing—when the student is able to testify on his own
behalf—violates the student’s procedural due process rights. Nor do they clearly establish
that allowing the hearing officer to author a decision on behalf of the decisionmaker makes
the decisionmaker biased or otherwise constitutes a procedural due process violation.
Accordingly, because Bass has not shown that the defendants’ conduct violates
clearly established law, the Court overrules his objections and dismisses his claim for
violation of his procedural due process rights.
c.

Stigma-Plus Claim

Bass next objects that the FCR incorrectly found that he has not pled a false
communication about him by a government actor that resulted in a stigma. Dkt. No. 56-1
at 27. “To make out a stigma-plus claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate that: (1) he has
suffered a stigma from some government action; plus (2) he experienced the extinguishment
of a right of status previously recognized by state law.” Babinski, 79 F.4th at 519 n.3. The
stigma must be caused by “concrete, false factual representations or assertions, by a state
actor, of wrongdoing on the part off the claimant.” San Jacinto Sav. & Loan v. Kacal, 928
F.2d 697, 701 (5th Cir. 1991). “[F]or a charge to be stigmatizing it must be worse than

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merely adverse; it must be such as would give rise to ‘a badge of infamy, public scorn, or the
like.’” Blackburn v. City of Marshall, 42 F.3d 925, 936 (5th Cir. 1995) (internal quotation
marks omitted) (quoting Wells v. Hico Indep. Sch. Dist., 736 F.2d 243, 256 & n.16 (5th Cir.
1984)).
Foremost, Bass again relies on materials outside of the operative pleading that are
not properly before the Court to allege that the individual defendants made false factual
statements that resulted in a stigma. See Dkt. No. 56-1 at 27 (citing Bass’s proposed
amended pleadings). In evaluating only his operative pleading, the Court agrees that Bass
does not sufficiently plead any false statements of fact. He contends the government actions
that caused the stigma were: (1) “a January 7, 2024[,] class-wide broadcast stating that the
class was ‘one student lighter than last week’ and directing recipients to ‘check [Bass’s]
Twitter’”; (2) an “Administrative Dismissal Effective 01-11-2024” notation on his transcript;
and (3) a “campus-wide and affiliate-hospital BOLO/ban and exclusion directives
suggesting [Bass] was dangerous.” Dkt. No. 14 at 16. But Bass does not allege that the
government actors stated that he was dangerous; rather, Bass pleads that “[t]hese
publications coincided with the loss of student status and conveyed dangerousness and
unfitness.” Id.
Even if the Court were to consider matters outside of his operative
pleading—namely, the language in the BOLO that Bass “made threatening posts on social
media,” Dkt. No. 32-2 at 5—Bass’s own pleadings allege that he made a post that certain
TTUHSC faculty and staff, as well as the Board, perceived as threatening. See Dkt. No. 14
at 8. Thus, the BOLO flyer communicating that Bass was banned from campus and
facilities for making a threatening social media post when, in fact, TTUHSC faculty and

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staff believed that the post was threatening does not qualify as a “false factual
representation[].” San Jacinto Sav. & Loan, 928 F.2d at 701. Nor is it one that would give
rise to “a ‘badge of infamy,’ public scorn, or the like,” Blackburn, 42 F.3d at 936 (quoting
Wells, 736 F.2d at 256 & n.16), as the same communication indicates that it should be
“place[d] . . . in a secure notebook” and not posted for public viewing, Dkt. No. 32-2 at 5.
Accordingly, Bass fails to state a stigma-plus due process claim and, consequently,
cannot state a constitutional violation and overcome the individual defendants’ assertion of
qualified immunity. The Court dismisses Bass’s stigma-plus claim.
d.

First Amendment Retaliation Claim

Likewise, Bass cannot overcome the individual defendants’ assertion of qualified
immunity from his First Amendment retaliation claim. To plead a First Amendment
retaliation claim, Bass must plead facts that state “(1) [he was] engaged in constitutionally
protected activity, (2) the defendants’ actions caused [him] to suffer an injury that would
chill a person of ordinary firmness from continuing to engage in that activity, and (3) the
defendants’ adverse actions were substantially motivated against the plaintiff[’s] exercise of
constitutionally protected conduct.” Keenan v. Tejeda, 290 F.3d 252, 258 (5th Cir. 2002).
Bass objects to Judge Burch’s determinations that Bass did not sufficiently plead the first
and third elements of his claim and that the individual defendants are entitled to qualified
immunity because the unlawfulness of their conduct was not clearly established. Dkt. No.
56-1 at 23–26.
“Qualified immunity should not be denied unless the law is clear in the more
particularized sense that reasonable officials should be ‘on notice that their conduct is
unlawful.’” Kinney v. Weaver, 367 F.3d 337, 350 (5th Cir. 2004) (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533

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U.S. 194, 206 (2001)). Even assuming Bass could state a First Amendment retaliation
claim, he has not identified authority that would put the individual defendants on notice
that their conduct was unlawful and overcome their qualified immunity defense.
Bass identifies Bailey v. Iles, 87 F.4th 275 (5th Cir. 2023), as authority that clearly
established that the defendants’ conduct was unlawful. See Dkt. No. 56-1 at 26. But Bailey
states only that “it was clearly established that [the plaintiff’s] Facebook post did not fit
within one of the narrow categories of unprotected speech, like incitement or true threats.”
Id. at 289. The plaintiff in Bailey was arrested as a direct result of a Facebook post, which
the Fifth Circuit determined was protected speech. See id. at 281–85, 289–90. The situation
at hand involves allegations in addition to engaging in potentially protected speech. As
Judge Burch correctly stated, Bass “points to no case giving [the defendants] ‘fair warning’
that they could not lawfully discipline a medical student who was facing conduct complaints
and negative evaluations at the same time the student was making controversial social
media posts and who then made a post that the school community perceived as
threatening.” Dkt. No. 54 at 45 (quoting Babinski, 79 F.4th at 524).
Thus, the Court concludes that, even if Bass could plead the elements of a First
Amendment retaliation claim, the unlawfulness of the defendants’ conduct was not clearly
established at the time of the alleged retaliation. Accordingly, the defendants are entitled to
qualified immunity, and the Court dismisses this claim.
iv.

The Court concludes that TTUHSC is entitled to sovereign
immunity from Bass’s ADA claims.

Bass next objects to the conclusion that his ADA claims seeking injunctive relief are
barred by sovereign immunity because he asserts no ongoing violation. See Dkt. No. 56-1 at
27–28. The Court agrees with Judge Burch that Bass fails to allege such ongoing violation.

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TTUHSC is a state agency entitled to sovereign immunity from suits for money
damages or injunctive relief unless it has waived such immunity. Sissom v. Univ. of Tex. High
Sch., 927 F.3d 343, 347–49 (5th Cir. 2019). However, “[t]he Ex parte Young exception [to
state immunity] ‘permits suits for prospective . . . relief against state officials acting in
violation of federal law.’” Green Valley Special Util. Dist. v. City of Schertz, 969 F.3d 460, 471
(5th Cir. 2020) (quoting Frew ex rel. Frew v. Hawkins, 540 U.S. 431, 437 (2004)). “In order to
demonstrate that a case or controversy exists to meet the Article III standing requirement
when a plaintiff is seeking injunctive or declaratory relief, a plaintiff must allege facts from
which it appears there is a substantial likelihood that he will suffer injury in the future.”
Waller v. Hanlon, 922 F.3d 590, 603 (5th Cir. 2019) (quoting Bauer v. Texas, 341 F.3d 352,
358 (5th Cir. 2003)). Thus, to succeed on such a claim, the plaintiff must assert an ongoing
violation of federal law by a state actor. Williams ex rel. J.E. v. Reeves, 954 F.3d 729, 736 (5th
Cir. 2020).
Bass contends that “the continuing refusal of a name-clearing hearing” and “each
enrollment-verification response” are continuing violations of the ADA. Dkt. No. 56 at 5.
The Court agrees with Judge Burch that neither of these alleged injuries, even taken as true,
allege a continuing violation of the ADA. See Dkt. No. 54 at 24–25. Bass’s ADA
allegations stem from the alleged denial of accommodations at the disciplinary hearing, see
Dkt. No. 14 at 13–15, which are distinct from his allegations related to the alleged
stigmatizing publications. Nothing about Bass’s allegations that TTUHSC refused a
name-clearing hearing and continues to distribute his transcript that includes the dismissal
notation allege a continuing violation of the ADA’s reasonable-accommodation
requirements. Thus, with respect to the injunctive relief requested in connection with his

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ADA claim, Bass’s allegations fail to meet the case or controversy requirement of Article III
standing. Waller, 922 F.3d at 603.
Without an allegation of a continuing violation, Bass’s request for injunctive relief is
barred by sovereign immunity. The Court thus dismisses Bass’s request for injunctive relief
related to his ADA claims.
v.

The Court overrules Bass’s objection to the FCR’s “background
characterization.”

Bass also objects to a statement included in the first paragraph of the FCR—that
“[h]e apparently engaged in objectionable conduct.” Dkt. No. 54 at 1. Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 72(b)(2) allows a party to “object[] to the proposed findings and
recommendations.” The introductory language is neither a finding nor a recommendation,
nor does it have any bearing on the Court’s disposition of Bass’s claims. Accordingly, the
Court overrules this objection.
*

*

*

For all of these reasons, the Court concludes that Bass has not stated any viable
claims and grants the defendants’ motion to dismiss (Dkt. No. 27).
C.

The Court overrules Bass’s objection to the conclusion that his proposed
amendments are futile and denies his motion for leave to amend.

Judge Burch next recommends that the Court deny Bass’s motion for leave to amend
(Dkt. No. 43) on the basis of futility. Bass objects to this recommendation, arguing that the
amendments in his proposed complaint (Dkt. No. 43-1) cure any defects in each of his
claims.
Bass’s objections are either too general and conclusory to warrant evaluation by the
Court or fail to overcome the deficiencies in his operative pleading. Because his proposed

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amendments are ultimately futile, the Court overrules his objections and denies his motion
for leave to file a second amended complaint.
i.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(1) allows a party to amend a pleading “once as
a matter of course” within 21 days of serving the pleading or receiving the opposing party’s
responsive pleading or motion. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1). “In all other cases, a party may
amend its pleading only with the opposing party’s written consent or the court’s leave.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). When evaluating whether to allow leave to amend under Rule 15,
“[t]he court should freely give leave when justice so requires.” Id. The Rule 15 standard
favors granting leave to amend, and a district court must have a “substantial reason” for
denying leave. Marucci Sports, LLC v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 751 F.3d 368, 378 (5th
Cir. 2014) (quoting Jones v. Robinson Prop. Grp., LP, 427 F.3d 987, 994 (5th Cir. 2005)). In
deciding whether to allow amendment of the complaint, a district court may consider
factors such as “undue delay, [the movant’s] bad faith or dilatory motive, repeated failures
to cure deficiencies by amendments . . . , undue prejudice to the opposing party . . . , and
futility of the amendment.” Id. (quoting Jones, 427 F.3d at 994). An amendment is futile if
it would not survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Id.
ii.

Bass’s proposed amendments are futile.

Foremost, Bass’s objections to the recommendation that the Court conclude that his
proposed amendments are futile are not specific and, thus, need not be evaluated by the
Court. See Battle, 834 F.2d at 421 (The district court need not consider “[f]rivolous,
conclusive[,] or general objections.”). “[A]n objection must identify the specific finding or
recommendation to which objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and specify

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the place in the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation where the disputed
determination is found.” Thompson, 2022 WL 17585271, at *1. Rather than asserting
specific objections to the FCR’s determinations as to each of Bass’s proposed amendments,
Bass generally objects that the magistrate judge’s rulings have prevented him from pleading
his best case.
According to Bass, the prior order denying leave to file a complaint that failed to
comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8’s requirement of a “short and plain”
statement, see Dkt. No. 42, combined with the FCR’s recommendation to deny leave
“because the [proposed] shortened complaint lacks those very details” included in his prior
proposed complaint create a “closed loop.” See Dkt. No. 56-1 at 7–8. But the FCR does not
find the proposed amendments futile for lack of detail. Instead, Judge Burch meticulously
evaluates each of Bass’s claims and any new allegation with respect to each claim and then
explains why the new allegations fail to plead the particular elements of each claim. See
Dkt. No. 54 at 45–56. Because Bass makes only a general allegation that the magistrate
judge’s rulings have put him in an impossible pleading predicament but fails to make
specific objections that put the Court on notice of any particular errors, the Court overrules
this objection.
Next, Bass again directs the Court to matters outside of his own motion and
proposed amended complaint to support his contention that “[e]very fact” necessary to
plead his claims “exists in the record.” Dkt. No. 56-1 at 9. Again, this objection fails for
lack of specificity. Thompson, 2022 WL 17585271, at *1 What is more, the Court evaluates
only the proposed pleadings when determining whether a plaintiff’s proposed amendments
are futile. See Marucci Sports, LLC, 751 F.3d at 378 (explaining that an amendment is futile if

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it would not survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss); Collins, 224 F.3d at 498 (stating that
“a district court must limit itself to the contents of the pleadings, including attachments
thereto” when determining whether a claim should be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6)).
Thus, matters outside of his pleadings are not properly before the Court when deciding
Bass’s motion for leave to amend. Accordingly, the Court overrules this objection.
With respect to specific objections, Bass first argues that the proposed amendments
to his procedural due process claim against Gibson are not futile for the same reasons he
addressed in what he labels as “Objection 4.” Dkt. No. 56-1 at 10. With respect to
Objection 4, the Court determined supra that Bass failed to allege facts against Gibson that,
even if true, would overcome his defense of qualified immunity. See Analysis § 3.B.iii.b.
Bass’s so-called “structural-independence facts”—that Gibson, the hearing officer, was paid
by TTUHSC to preside over such hearings, Dkt. No. 56-1 at 10—do not alter the conclusion
that it was not clearly established at the time of the hearing that the defendants’ conduct was
unlawful. This objection is overruled.
Bass next argues that his proposed amendments state a claim for ADA and RA
retaliation because he alleges that: (1) the defendant, Cobbs, directed Bass’s professionalism
coach to cease all contact with the plaintiff, “terminating his only support relationship
during the critical pre-hearing period”; and (2) TTUHSC escalated a dormant debt owed by
the plaintiff immediately after he filed a public information request for TTUHSC’s records.
Dkt. Nos. 43-1 at 24; 56-1 at 10. As Judge Burch correctly points out, neither of these new
factual allegations overcome TTUHSC’s sovereign immunity from ADA retaliation claims
because Bass does not allege a continuing violation. See infra Analysis § B.iv; see also Dkt.
No. 54 at 25–26, 51.

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Nor do these allegations save his RA retaliation claim. Bass contests that the FCR
compares the Title VII standard for a materially adverse action with the RA standard. See
Dkt. Nos. 54 at 51; 56-1 at 10. But Bass’s disagreement with cited authority does not cure
the fact that Bass alleges only that this action was retaliatory—not that cutting off
communication with his professionalism coach prior to his disciplinary hearing was a
materially adverse action that would dissuade him from engaging in a protected activity.
See Grodman, 816 F. Supp. 3d at 622 (stating that a plaintiff must allege a causal connection
between the protected activity and the materially adverse action to state an RA retaliation
claim). Thus, his RA retaliation claim based on this alleged action fails.
Moreover, although he identifies TTUHSC’s alleged escalation of an owed debt as a
retaliatory action, he has not pled facts or cited to authority that his public information
request is a protected activity or that, but for this activity, TTUHSC would not have
escalated his debt—a debt that he does not dispute he owes. Cf. Jeudy, 2026 WL 675683, at
*5 (noting that the plaintiff failed courses because she failed to complete the work, not
because the school retaliated against her for engaging in a protected activity). Thus, the
Court overrules this objection.
Finally, Bass objects that the FCR fails to evaluate his request to add Dr. David
Trotter as a defendant. Dkt. No. 56-1 at 10. However, because Bass fails to state a viable
claim and because any claim against Trotter based on the alleged facts would be barred by
qualified immunity, the addition of Trotter as a defendant is futile. In his proposed
complaint, Bass alleges that Trotter violated his due process rights by “abandon[ing] the
negotiated hearing structure without notice and alter[ing] the procedural framework to
[Bass’s] detriment.” Dkt. No. 43-1 at 20. In support, Bass alleges that “Trotter told [him]

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that grievances would be heard first because that structure provided the most protection,”
and Bass “accepted the hearing over voluntary withdrawal in reliance on that
representation.” Id. at 10–11. But Bass’s proposed pleading also alleges that Gibson and
TTUHSC’s general counsel—not Trotter—conducted the hearing and disallowed Trotter
from testifying. Id. at 11–12. Bass’s own contentions refute that Trotter was responsible for
the “hearing structure” and, thus, he has not pled facts that allege a due process violation by
Trotter. What is more, he has not presented any authority that it was clearly established
that Trotter’s alleged conduct was unconstitutional; therefore, Trotter is entitled to qualified
immunity. Thus, adding Trotter as a defendant would be futile.
In sum, the Court has reviewed the plaintiffs’ proposed complaint in full, agrees that
the proposed amendments are futile, and adopts the FCR’s recommendation to deny the
motion for leave to amend (Dkt. No. 43).
4.

Conclusion
In sum, the plaintiff’s objections to the FCR, by and large, reflect a

misunderstanding of the law and rely on materials outside of the operative pleading. Bass
has failed to state claims upon which relief may be granted and has not alleged facts that
overcome the defenses of sovereign and qualified immunity. Moreover, the plaintiff’s
proposed amended pleading does not cure the defects in his claims. Thus, the Court
overrules the plaintiff’s objections and adopts the FCR (Dkt. No. 54).
Accordingly, the Court grants the defendants’ motion to dismiss (Dkt. No. 27) and
denies the plaintiff’s motion for leave to file a second amended complaint (Dkt. No. 43).
Because the Court determines that it does not have subject-matter jurisdiction over the ADA

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claims and the RA claim for declaratory relief, these claims are dismissed without prejudice.
All other claims are dismissed with prejudice.
So ordered on September 23, 2026.

JAMES WESLEY HENDRIX
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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