Order denying the renewed motion for leave (Dkt. 57)¶

Bass v. TTUHSC, No. 5:25-cv-00244-H-BV (N.D. Tex.) · Dkt. 61 · 2026-09-23 · PDF

Text extracted from the PDF; scanned pages were read by OCR. The PDF is the authoritative copy.

Case 5:25-cv-00244-H-BV

Document 61

Filed 09/23/26

Page 1 of 7

PageID 1768

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
LUBBOCK DIVISION
KEVIN N. BASS,
Plaintiff,
v.

No. 5:25-CV-244-H

TEXAS TECH UNIVERSITY HEALTH
SCIENCES CENTER, et al.,
Defendants.
ORDER
The plaintiff, Kevin Bass, proceeding pro se, filed a renewed motion for leave to file
a second amended complaint (Dkt. No. 57). Bass filed the motion in response to the
Findings, Conclusions, and Recommendations (FCR) of United States Magistrate Judge
Amanda ‘Amy’ R. Burch (Dkt. No. 54). Judge Burch recommended that the Court grant
the defendants’ motion to dismiss all claims (Dkt. No. 27) and deny the plaintiff’s pending
motion for leave to amend his complaint (Dkt. No. 43) because the proposed amendments
are futile.1
Bass amended his complaint once as of right (Dkt. No. 14) and has sought leave to
amend three times prior to his current request. See Dkt. Nos. 26; 32; 43. In the instant
motion for leave to amend (Dkt. No. 57), Bass submits yet another proposed amended
complaint with more-detailed factual allegations than his operative pleading. Because the
Court has twice denied the plaintiff leave to amend and because his proposed amendments
are futile, the Court denies the motion.

1

The Court, by separate order, overrules Bass’s objections and adopts the FCR in full. Dkt. No. 60.
For brevity’s sake, the Court incorporates the factual background and procedural history in that
order and does not recount it here. See id. at 2–6.

Case 5:25-cv-00244-H-BV

1.

Document 61

Filed 09/23/26

Page 2 of 7

PageID 1769

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15 Legal Standard
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(1) allows a party to amend a pleading “once as

a matter of course” within 21 days of serving the pleading or receiving the opposing party’s
responsive pleading or motion. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1). “In all other cases, a party may
amend its pleading only with the opposing party’s written consent or the court’s leave.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). When evaluating whether to allow leave to amend under Rule 15,
“[t]he court should freely give leave when justice so requires.” Id. The Rule 15 standard
favors granting leave to amend, and a district court must have a “substantial reason” for
denying leave. Marucci Sports, LLC v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 751 F.3d 368, 378 (5th
Cir. 2014) (quoting Jones v. Robinson Prop. Grp., LP, 427 F.3d 987, 994 (5th Cir. 2005)). In
deciding whether to allow amendment of the complaint, a district court may consider
factors such as “undue delay, [the movant’s] bad faith or dilatory motive, repeated failures
to cure deficiencies by amendments . . . , undue prejudice to the opposing party . . . , and
futility of the amendment.” Id. (quoting Jones, 427 F.3d at 994).
2.

Analysis
Because the plaintiff has previously failed to cure the defects in his pleading and

because his proposed amendments are futile, the Court denies the motion.
A.

The plaintiff has repeatedly failed to cure deficiencies by previous
amendments.

“The district court is entrusted with the discretion to grant or deny a motion to
amend and may consider a variety of factors including ‘. . . repeated failures to cure
deficiencies by amendments previously allowed.’” Marucci Sports, 751 F.3d at 378 (quoting
Jones, 427 F.3d at 994). This is Bass’s fifth attempt to amend his complaint since filing suit.
See Dkt. Nos. 14; 26; 32; 43; 57. The magistrate judge previously denied leave to amend for

–2–

Case 5:25-cv-00244-H-BV

Document 61

Filed 09/23/26

Page 3 of 7

PageID 1770

failure to comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 and because Bass’s proposed
amendments would be futile. Dkt. No. 42. Following this order, Bass again moved for
leave to amend and submitted a proposed amended complaint. Dkt. Nos. 43; 43-1. He
“[gave] no indication that he did not plead his best case in his [proposed] complaint.”
Brewster v. Dretke, 587 F.3d 764, 768 (5th Cir. 2009). The magistrate judge and this Court
again found the proposed amended complaint futile. Dkt. Nos. 54; 60. Accordingly, the
Court is “justified to dismiss [Bass’s] claims without providing another opportunity for
[him] to amend [his] complaint after [he] failed to follow the pleading requirements for the
second time.” McZeal v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Tr. Co., 726 F. App’x 968, 971 (5th Cir. 2018);
see also Body by Cook, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 869 F.3d 381, 391 (5th Cir. 2017)
(determining a district court did not abuse its discretion when denying a plaintiff leave to
amend a complaint for a third time). Denial of leave to amend is appropriate on this basis
alone.
B.

The plaintiff’s proposed amendments are futile.

Although the Court can deny the plaintiff’s request to amend based only on his
repeated failure to cure, because the plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the Court has evaluated
each added factual allegation in the most recent proposed amended complaint (Dkt. No.
57-2). Cf. Taylor v. Books A Million, Inc., 296 F.3d 376, 378 (5th Cir. 2002) (quoting Miller v.
Stanmore, 636 F.2d 986, 988 (5th Cir. Unit A Feb. 1981) (“It is well-established that ‘pro se
complaints are held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’”).
Even so, a pro se plaintiff is not excused from the requirements to “properly plead sufficient
facts that, when liberally construed, state a plausible claim to relief . . . .” EEOC v. Simbaki,
Ltd., 767 F.3d 475, 484 (5th Cir. 2014), as revised (Sept. 18, 2014). The Court again

–3–

Case 5:25-cv-00244-H-BV

Document 61

Filed 09/23/26

Page 4 of 7

PageID 1771

concludes that the proposed amendments are futile. See Marucci Sports, 751 F.3d at 378
(stating that a proposed amendment is futile if it would not survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion
to dismiss).
As discussed in more detail in the Court’s order adopting the FCR, Bass’s claims do
not fail because his complaint is missing particular factual details. See Dkt. No. 60 at 28–29.
Rather, as the defendants point out, Bass’s claims are either barred by sovereign or qualified
immunity or fail because, even if his proposed factual allegations are taken as true, they fail
to state a claim for which relief may be granted. See id. at 8–27. In the instant motion for
leave to amend, Bass lists the facts added to his proposed complaint in a table, see Dkt. No.
57-1 at 5–6, without explaining how the addition of each fact overcomes the legal
deficiencies in his complaint. And the added factual allegations in the proposed complaint,
even taken as true, do not state claims that would survive a motion to dismiss pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and are thus futile.
First, presumably in reference to his First Amendment retaliation claim, Bass
includes the content of the social media post at issue and the allegation that the general
counsel for the defendant Texas Tech University Health Sciences Center (TTUHSC) stated
that Bass’s removal from medical school was “prompted by [Bass’s] Social Media post.”
Dkt. Nos. 57-1 at 4; 57-2 ¶¶ 1, 31–32. But even if TTUHSC’s general counsel made this
statement, this allegation does not negate the legal conclusion that Bass failed to meet his
burden to show that it was clearly established that the defendants’ conduct was
unconstitutional at the time of the disciplinary hearing. See Dkt. Nos. 54 at 45; 60 at 24–25.
Bass’s other allegations in the proposed complaint confirm that, when deciding the outcome
of the disciplinary hearing, the defendants considered “professionalism concerns,” “the

–4–

Case 5:25-cv-00244-H-BV

Document 61

Filed 09/23/26

Page 5 of 7

PageID 1772

comments of assessors in clinical clerkships,” and “complaints” about Bass’s behavior in
addition to his social media posts. Dkt. No. 57-2 ¶ 34. Thus, the addition of the allegation
regarding TTUHSC’s general counsel and the specific content of the social media post does
not change the conclusion that “Bass ‘points to no case giving [the defendants] ‘fair
warning’ that they could not lawfully discipline a medical student who was facing conduct
complaints and negative evaluations at the same time the student was making controversial
social media posts and who then made a post that the school community perceived as
threatening.’” Dkt. No. 60 at 25 (quoting Dkt. No. 54 at 45). These proposed amendments
are accordingly futile.
As another example, in support of his failure-to-accommodate RA claim, Bass
alleges that, even though “one partial business day existed” between the Friday he requested
accommodations from TTUHSC’s Student Disability Services (SDS) and informed the
Student Conduct Board of such request and the following Monday when the Board held its
disciplinary hearing, “TTUHSC controlled the hearing date and chose not to
postpone . . . .” See Dkt. No. 57-2 ¶ 37. But nothing in this allegation refutes the
conclusions that “Bass’s last-minute submission prevented SDS from engaging in th[e]
interactive process” required for reasonable accommodations, that Bass ever requested a
continuation of the hearing, or that failure to continue the hearing after a last-minute request
amounts to a failure to accommodate. See Dkt. No. 54 at 17–18 (collecting authorities).
Therefore, the proposed amendment is futile.
Similarly, Bass includes new allegations about the conduct of his professionalism
coach and states in his motion that the coach’s conduct dissuaded him from filing
complaints. See Dkt. Nos. 57-1 at 6; 57-2 ¶ 30. But Bass’s retaliation claim in his proposed

–5–

Case 5:25-cv-00244-H-BV

Document 61

Filed 09/23/26

Page 6 of 7

PageID 1773

complaint alleges that he engaged in a different protected activity—requesting
accommodations, Dkt. No. 57-2 ¶ 95—and that a different individual—a defendant,
Cobbs—engaged in retaliatory conduct by cutting off Bass’s communication with the
professionalism coach, id. ¶ 97. These new factual details about the professionalism coach’s
dissuading actions do not support Bass’s claim that Cobbs cutting off communication
between Bass and his professionalism coach prior to Bass’s disciplinary hearing was a
materially adverse action that would dissuade a student from requesting accommodations.
See Dkt. No. 60 at 31. In short, Bass’s expanded narrative explanation of the events that led
to his dismissal from medical school does not cure the legal deficiencies in his stated claims.
Elsewhere, Bass refers to his objections to the FCR in support of his argument that
his amendments are not futile. Dkt. No. 57-1 at 6–7. But the Court has already evaluated
and rejected each objection. See Dkt. No. 60.
Finally, Bass attempts to add Dr. David Trotter as a defendant, and the parties
dispute whether such addition is timely. See Dkt. Nos. 57-1 at 7–8; 58 at 10–12; 59 at 7–9.
But the Court need not evaluate the timeliness of this addition because the Court previously
determined that Bass failed to state a procedural due process claim against Trotter and, in
any event, Trotter is entitled to qualified immunity from such claim. See Dkt. No. 60 at
31–32. Neither Bass’s proposed addition of Trotter as a defendant nor his contention that
the addition of a new defendant relates back to his original filing date alters this analysis.
3.

Conclusion
In short, Bass’s most recent proposed complaint adds new details and convoluted

arguments but fails, for the fifth time, to show how his proposed amendments overcome the
defenses of sovereign or qualified immunity or sufficiently state the elements of his claims.

–6–

Case 5:25-cv-00244-H-BV

Document 61

Filed 09/23/26

Page 7 of 7

PageID 1774

Because Bass has failed to cure the deficiencies through previous amendments and because
the proposed amendments would be futile, the Court denies Bass’s renewed motion for
leave to file a second amended complaint (Dkt. No. 57).
So ordered on September 23, 2026.

JAMES WESLEY HENDRIX
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

–7–