ORDER granting in part and denying in part 9 Motion to dismiss. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.Specifically, the Motion is GRANTED¶

Patel v. Texas Tech University et al, No. 5:17-cv-00174-C (N.D. Tex.) · Dkt. 25 · 2017-09-26 · PDF

Text extracted from the PDF; scanned pages were read by OCR. The PDF is the authoritative copy.

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
LUBBOCK DIVISION

RAJIN PATEL,
Plaintiff,
v.
TEXAS TECH UNIVERSITY, et aI.,
Defendants.

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Civil Action No. 5:17-CV-174-C

ORDER
On this day, the Court considered Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, filed
September 1, 2017, and Plaintiff Raj in Patel's Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss,
filed September 13,2017. Having considered the foregoing, the Court is of the opinion that
Defendants' Motion should be GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Raj in Patel is a business student at Texas Tech University. During the fall
semester of the 2016-17 academic year, he was enrolled in a graduate school course taught by
Defendant Duane Jones. After Jones accused Patel of academic dishonesty on a final exam,
Texas Tech conducted an internal inquiry that resulted in an adverse Final Investigation Report.
After a panel hearing, the Student Conduct Office found Patel guilty of academic dishonesty,
dismissed him from the College of Business graduate program, put him on deferred suspension
until January of 20 18 in his undergraduate classes, and gave him a grade of "F" in his graduate
school course. The deferred suspension further requires Patel to pay a penalty for plagiarism,
admit that he plagiarized his exam answers, and enroll in an academic integrity course about

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plagiarism. Patel's internal appeal was denied by Texas Tech. On April 26, 2017, Texas Tech
froze Patel's account after he refused to pay the plagiarism penalty, effectively barring him from
completing his undergraduate degree and costing him a prestigious summer internship.
Patel brought this civil action against Texas Tech and Defendants Duane Jones, William
Pasewark, Robert Ricketts, and Brittany Todd (all officers or agents of Texas Tech) in their
official and individual capacities. He asserts causes of action under 42 U.S.c. § 1983 for
substantive due process and equal protection violations, as well as a cause of action against
Texas Tech for breach of contract. Defendants now move to dismiss each of these claims.

II. STANDARDS
12(b)(1) Motion to Dismiss
Lack of subject-matter jurisdiction may be found in anyone of three instances: (1) the
complaint alone, (2) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts evidenced in the record, or
(3) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts plus the court's resolution of disputed facts.

Ramming v. United States, 281 F.3d 158,161 (5th Cir. 2001). The burden of proof for a Rule
12(b)(1) motion to dismiss is on the party asserting jurisdiction. Id. Accordingly, the plaintiff
constantly bears the burden of proof that jurisdiction does in fact exist. Id. In examining a Rule
12(b)(1) motion, the district court is empowered to consider matters of fact that may be in
dispute. Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 413 (1981). Ultimately, a motion to dismiss for
lack of subject-matter jurisdiction should be granted only if it appears certain that the plaintiff
cannot prove any set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle plaintiff to relief. Home

Builders Ass 'n ofMiss., Inc. v. City ofMadison, Miss., 143 F.3d 1006, 1010 (5th Cir. 1998).

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12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss

A complaint must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). The court must accept all factual allegations in
a complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff s favor. Lormand v. US
Unwired, Inc., 565 F.3d 228, 232 (5th Cir. 2009). In reviewing a motion to dismiss under Rule

12(b)(6), a district court must generally examine only the complaint and any attachments to the
complaint. Collins v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, 224 F.3d 496, 498 (5th Cir. 2000). But a
court may consider extrinsic documentary evidence if (1) the document is attached to a
defendant's motion to dismiss, (2) the document is referred to in the plaintiffs complaint, and
(3) the document is "central" to the plaintiffs claim. !d. at 498-99. To survive a 12(b)(6)
motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain enough facts to state a claim that is "plausible on its
face." Bell At!. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible when
it asserts facts that allow the court "to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). This determination is
context-specific and requires the court to draw upon its own experience and common sense. Id.

III. DISCUSSION
Defendants move to dismiss each of Plaintiffs claims under Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(l) and 12(b)(6). When a Rule 12(b)(1) motion is filed in conjunction with other
Rule 12 motions, the court should consider the Rule 12(b)(1) jurisdictional attack before
addressing any attack on the merits. Ramming, 281 F.3d at 161. This requirement prevents a
court without jurisdiction from prematurely dismissing a case with prejudice. Id. Accordingly,
the Court addresses Defendants' 12(b)(I) motion first.

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A. Jurisdictional Attacks
1. Immunity from § 1983 Claims

Defendant Texas Tech and the individual Defendants in their official capacities move to
dismiss Patel's § 1983 claims pursuant to the doctrine of sovereign immunity. But Patel
correctly points out that sovereign immunity only shields state-actor Defendants from monetary
damages, and Patel's Complaint clearly does not seek impermissible monetary damages. Instead,
Patel seeks injunctive relief against the state-actor Defendants pursuant to the exception
established by Ex Parte Young. See Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908); Saltz v. Tennessee
Dep 't ofEmp 't Sec., 976 F.2d 966, 968 (5th Cir. 1992) ("The essential ingredients of the Ex
parte Young doctrine are that a suit must be brought against individual persons in their official
capacities as agents of the state and the relief sought must be declaratory or injunctive in nature
and prospective in effect.").
The Court is of the opinion that Defendant Texas Tech is clearly immune from § 1983
claims under the Eleventh Amendment and Defendant Texas Tech's Motion to Dismiss must be
granted with respect to these claims. E.g., United States v. Texas Tech Univ., 171 F.3d 279,289
n.14 (5th Cir. 1999); Gaines v. Texas Tech Univ., 965 F. Supp. 886, 889 (N.D. Tex. 1997).
However, the Court is further satisfied that Patel has adequately pleaded a claim for injunctive
relief against the individual Defendants in their official capacities; Patel's § 1983 claims against
these Defendants satisfy the Ex Parte Young exception to sovereign immunity and are not
jurisdictionally barred.

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2. Immunity from Breach of Contract Claim

Defendant Texas Tech further argues that it is entitled to sovereign immunity on Patel's
breach of contract claim because the Texas Legislature has not waived immunity for breach of
contract suits. See Gen. Servs. Comm 'n v. Little-Tex Insulation Co., 39 S.W.3d 591,594 (Tex.
2001). While this statement of the law is generally true, the Court is persuaded by Patel's
arguments that Texas Tech's immunity has been waived in this case pursuant to the Texas Local
Government Code and the nature of Patel's contractual relationship with Texas Tech. Tex. Gov't
Code Ann. § 271.152; see Burnett v. College ofthe Mainland, 994 F. Supp. 2d 823,829 (S.D.
Tex. 2014).
Notably, Defendant Texas Tech did not seek to file any reply to Patel's arguments and
has not presented evidence that its student handbook provides any disclaimer about express or
implied contracts. Compare Univ. ofTex. Health Sci. Ctr. at Houston v. Babb, 646 S.W.2d 502,
506 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1982, no writ) (finding that a school catalog was an express
contract where it assured students that it would remain in effect during their completion of the
program) with Tobias v. Univ. of Tex. at Arlington, 824 S.W.2d 201,211 (Tex. App.-Fort
Worth 1991, writ denied) (finding that a school catalog was not a binding contract because it
contained a disclaimer of any contractual relationship). The Court reserves the right to revisit
this jurisdictional issue if Defendant Texas Tech can later produce evidence that it expressly
disclaimed any contract with Patel. For now, the Court is satisfied that Patel has pleaded a valid
claim for breach of contract against Defendant Texas Tech for which Texas Tech's sovereign
immunity has been waived.

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B. Qualified Immunity
The individual Defendants further argue that all claims against them in their individual
capacities should be dismissed pursuant to the doctrine of qualified immunity. It is the usual
practice of this Court to call for motions for summary judgment on the issue of qualified
immunity once that defense has been properly raised. The Court notes that Plaintiffs Motion for
Preliminary Injunction is currently pending and that request for temporary injunctive relief
should be addressed as soon as possible. Further, the Court notes that any qualified immunity
analysis is not likely to have an impact on the request for preliminary injunctive relief because
this doctrine only protects the Defendants from claims asserted against them in their individual
capacities, and Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief against the Defendants in their official capacities.
Therefore, the Court denies the Motion to Dismiss without prejudice as to any qualified
immunity arguments. The Court will address the qualified immunity issue by calling for a
separate motion for summary judgment (in accordance with the Court's normal procedures) after
the Court has addressed Plaintiffs Motion for Preliminary Injunction.

C. Plausibility of Plaintifrs Complaint
Having addressed Defendants' jurisdictional and qualified immunity arguments, the
Court now turns to the 12(b)(6) motion. Defendants argue that Plaintiffs equal protection claim
is not sufficiently pleaded and that the Complaint fails to state a claim for injunctive relief.
Accepting all factual allegations in the Complaint as true and drawing all reasonable inferences
in Patel's favor, the Court is of the opinion that the Complaint is sufficiently well-pleaded to
survive Defendants' 12(b)(6) Motion. For the reasons more thoroughly stated in Plaintiffs Brief,
that Motion is denied as to both arguments.

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IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, as well as those more thoroughly stated in the parties'
briefing, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
Specifically, the Motion is GRANTED as to the § 1983 claims asserted against Defendant Texas
Tech and these claims are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for lack ofjurisdiction. The
Motion is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE as to the individual Defendants' qualified
immunity arguments and DENIED in all other respects .
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A..

SO ORDERED this _aUfl_·_ day of September, 2017.

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