REPLY filed by Schyler Grodman re: 14 MOTION for Leave to File First Amended Complaint (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order) (Tillotson, Jeffrey)¶

Grodman v. Texas Tech University Health Sciences Center, No. 5:23-cv-00210 (N.D. Tex.) · Dkt. 19 · 2024-01-11 · PDF

Text extracted from the PDF; scanned pages were read by OCR. The PDF is the authoritative copy.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
LUBBOCK DIVISION
SCHYLER Z. GRODMAN, M.D.,
Plaintiff,
v.
TEXAS TECH UNIVERSITY HEALTH
SCIENCES CENTER,
Defendant.

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Civil Action No. 5:23-cv-00210-H

PLAINTIFF’S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR LEAVE
TO FILE FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT
Plaintiff Schyler Z. Grodman, M.D., (“Plaintiff” or “Grodman”) hereby files this Reply in
Support of Motion for Leave to File First Amended Complaint (the “Reply”) pursuant to Fed. R.
Civ. P. 15(a)(2) and Local Rule 15.1(b), and in support thereof shows as follows:
I.

INTRODUCTION

On December 4, 2023, Grodman filed his Motion for Leave to File First Amended
Complaint (the “Motion for Leave”) [ECF. No. 14] seeking leave to file an Amended Complaint
including four claims against Texas Tech University Health Services Center (“Defendant” or
“Texas Tech”) and a fifth claim against a past director of Texas Tech in his individual capacity.
Texas Tech’s Response to Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File First Amended Complaint (the
“Response”) challenges three of Grodman’s claims against Texas Tech. Specifically, Texas Tech’s
Response challenges Grodman’s (1) claim for failure to accommodate and (2) discrimination under
the Rehabilitation Act, and (3) Grodman’s procedural due process claim against Texas Tech.
Texas Tech’s Response relies and cites to the standards under Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) and 12(b)(6).
See Response [ECF No. 16] at pg. 1-2.

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As outlined in this Reply, Grodman requests that grant Grodman’s Motion for Leave as to
each of these claims, as well as the other claims which are not addressed by Texas Tech’s
Response, because this is Grodman’s First Amended Complaint, and because Grodman has
pleaded sufficient factual allegations to meet the low pleading standard applicable at this
procedural phase. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2); 15(a)(2). Moreover, this Court has federal subject matter
jurisdiction over all of Grodman’s claims arising under federal and constitutional law. See 28
U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343(a)(3)-(4).
II.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On September 7, 2023, Plaintiff Grodman filed his Original Complaint [ECF No. 1],
alleging violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), Texas Commission on Human
Rights Act (“TCHRA”), and Rehabilitation Act for various discriminatory improper acts by
Defendant Texas Tech related to Grodman’s attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (“ADHD”),
Autism Spectrum Disorder (“ASD”), depression, and social anxiety and for Texas Tech’s wrongful
termination of Grodman. Texas Tech filed a Partial Motion to Dismiss on October 4, 2023 [ECF
No. 5], alleging lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1)
for Grodman’s ADA and TCHRA claims based on sovereign immunity.
On December 4, 2023, Grodman then filed a Motion for Leave to File First Amended
Complaint, seeking leave to file Grodman’s First Amended Complaint (the “Amended
Complaint”) [ECF No. 14], which withdrew two claims for discrimination and retaliation under
the ADA and TCHRA and added a Procedural Due Process claim (not a Substantive Due Process
claim) against Texas Tech and against individual Dr. Samer Zaid-Kaylani (“Kaylani”) under 42
U.S.C. § 1983. Grodman’s Amended Complaint seeks reinstatement, expungement of probation,
and release of academic records. See Am. Compl. [ECF No. 14-1] at 31.

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III.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2)
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2) a “court should freely give leave [to amend
pleadings] when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). This decision is within the “sound
discretion” of the district court, but the request should not be denied under Rule 15(a) “unless there
is a substantial reason to do so.” Mailing and Shipping Sys, Inc. v. Neopost USA, Inc., 292 F.R.D.
369, 376 (W.D. Tex. 2013); Leffall v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 28 F.3d 521, 524 (5th Cir. 1994)).
As a matter of equity, Rule 15(a) favors giving leave to amend. See Iron Oak Tech., LLC v. Dell,
Inc., 2018 WL 1631396, at *2 (W.D. Tex. Apr. 4, 2018); Lyn–Lea Travel Corp. v. Am. Airlines,
283 F.3d 282, 286 (5th Cir. 2002).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2)
To state a claim upon which relief can be granted, a complaint must contain “a short and
plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
The complaint must set forth enough facts to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554, 570 (2007). A claim is factually plausible when the
factual content allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “Conclusory allegations,
unwarranted factual inferences, or legal conclusions” are not accepted as true. Plotkin v. IP Axess
Inc., 407 F.3d 690, 696 (5th Cir. 2005) (citing Southland Sec. Corp. v. INSpire Ins. Solutions, Inc.,
365 F.3d 353, 361 (5th Cir. 2004)).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)
To the extent Texas Tech’s Response also moves to dismiss Grodman’s several of claims
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), Grodman provides the relevant standard here. Generally,

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“[m]otions to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) are viewed with disfavor and are rarely
granted.” Harbin v. Cmty. Educ. Ctrs., Inc., 2012 WL 3073752 (E.D. Tex. June 14, 2012) report
and recommendation adopted, 2012 WL 3074686 (E.D. Tex. July 27, 2012) (citing Kaiser
Aluminum & Chem. Sales v. Avondale Shipyards, 677 F.2d 1045, 1050 (5th Cir. 1982); Sosa v.
Coleman, 646 F.2d 991, 993 (5th Cir.1981)). In order “to survive a defendant’s Rule 12(b)(6)
arguments towards a motion to dismiss, a complaint ‘does not need detailed factual allegations,’
but must provide plaintiffs grounds for entitlement to relief—including factual allegations that
when assumed to be true ‘raise a right to relief above the speculative level.’” Cuvillier v.
Taylor,503 F.3d 397, 401 (5th Cir. 2007) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. 544). Further, a court must
“construe [the] facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, as a motion to dismiss
under [R]ule 12(b)(6) ‘is viewed with disfavor and is rarely granted.’” Turner v. Pleasant, 663
F.3d 770, 775 (5th Cir. 2011).
Therefore, a complaint need only “contain sufficient factual matter” accepted as true in the
light most favorable to the nonmoving party, “to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “Sufficient procedures are
available to defendants to seek summary disposition of a lawsuit after a plaintiff has been afforded
some opportunity to develop facts to support her complaint.” Tinoco v. Raleeh, 2006 WL 27287
at *1 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 5, 2006).
IV.

ARGUMENTS AND AUTHORITIES

A. Grodman Sufficiently Pleads a Disability Discrimination Claim Under the
Rehabilitation Act.
To plead a prima facie case of disability discrimination under the Rehabilitation Act,
Plaintiff must plead (1) he is a qualified individual with a disability; (2) he suffered discrimination;
and (3) the discrimination was due to his disability. Melton v. Dallas Area Rapid Transit, 391 F.3d

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669, 676 n.8 (5th Cir. 2004); Windham v. Harris Cnty., Tex., 875 F.3d 229, 235 (5th Cir. 2017).
Texas Tech challenges the sufficiency of Grodman’s pleading only as to the third element, that the
discrimination was due to his disability.
1. Grodman has sufficiently pleaded that Texas Tech’s discrimination was “solely” due
to his disability.
Grodman has sufficiently pleaded that Texas Tech’s discrimination was “solely” due to his
disability as required by Soledad v. U.S. Dep't of Treasury. 304 F.3d 500, 504 (5th Cir. 2002); see
also Windham v. Harris Cnty., Tex., 875 F.3d 229, 235 (5th Cir. 2017). Grodman alleges that due
to his disabilities, Texas Tech viewed him as a “poison pill” to any program that would take
Grodman after his graduation. Thus, Grodman alleges that Texas Tech came up with a plan to
summarily terminate Grodman before he finished his last semester that included withdrawing all
informal accommodations provided to Grodman:
“Defendant determined that even if Grodman was successfully placed into
a fellowship program, Grodman’s disabilities, and the manifestations of
those disabilities, would somehow negatively affect Defendant’s standing.
Defendant discontinued these accommodations knowing (and hoping) that
it would negatively affect Grodman’s ability to perform his obligations in
the program, especially with all the additional stressors of Grodman’s final
year. Upon information and belief, Defendant withdrew the informal
accommodations to manufacture a basis on which to terminate Grodman.
Am. Complaint at ¶¶ 31-34 [ECF No. 14-1]. In support, Grodman cites an internal email from
Raphael Mattamal dated December 5, 2021, stating that Grodman would be a “poison pill to any
program that actually takes him for future [Texas Tech] residents.”) (emphasis added). Dr.
Mattamal’s communications clearly show Defendant’s motivation in using Grodman’s disability
as a basis to terminate him.
Taken as true, Grodman’s Amended Complaint sufficiently pleads facts underlying a claim
for discrimination. Indeed, the Amended Complaint alleges that Grodman’s disabilities were the

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reason Texas Tech regarded Grodman as a “poison pill” and in process of removing him, Texas
Tech used Grodman’s disabilities to manufacture a cause of termination. See, e.g., Am. Complaint
[ECF No. 14-1] at ¶ 90 (“Grodman did, and still does, challenge the truth and integrity of Texas
Tech’s termination process, which was spearheaded by Kaylani, and its dismissal recommendation
by the Committee, which was made without the Committee even considering Grodman’s request
for accommodations. As such, these actions were taken without cause and were arbitrary and
capricious.”).
2. Grodman’s asserts a variety of other allegations that support an inference that his
disabilities were the “sole cause” of his termination.
The following allegations are also present in Grodman’s Amended Complaint [ECF No.
14-1], which taken together, also support a finding that Texas Tech’s motive and reason for
terminating Grodman was based on his disabilities, and not on his alleged performance or conduct:
First, the Amended Complaint alleges that Texas Tech extremely expedited Grodman’s
termination over the period of winter break, a period when Texas Tech knew Grodman was
adjusting the dosage of his medication used to treat his disabilities. See, e.g., Am. Complaint at ¶¶
24, 50 (“Under [Texas Tech’s] procedures, a resident is required to be given at least sixty days
(60) after probation before termination is considered so that the resident can show improvement.
Here, [Texas Tech] terminated Grodman only 18 days after placing Grodman under Probation,
completely ignoring Grodman’s request for accommodations due to his disability (a fact which
[Texas Tech] has admitted).”) (emphasis added); Ex. A (Dec. 5, 2021 email from Director of Texas
Tech requesting “immediate placement on probation status with possible eventual decision for
termination.”); id at ¶ 60 (“Defendant was aware that, at this point, Grodman was adjusting his
ADHD medications”).

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Second, the Amended Complaint alleges, and attaches internal communications, showing
that Texas Tech deliberately based its decision to terminate Grodman on his disabilities and the
burden of providing Grodman informal accommodations. See, e.g., Am. Complaint, Ex. C
(Bhaskaran’s response to Kaylani’s request to initiate disciplinary proceedings stating “I vote Yes
to proceed with probation/termination. We have made enough and more accommodations for him
than any program would have.” (emphasis added)); see also Ex. D (“I second Dr. Bhaskaran’s
comment”).
Third, Grodman’s Amended Complaint alleges sufficient facts to establish that Texas Tech
avoided the opportunity for Grodman to request accommodations and deliberately and improperly
refused to consider Grodman’s requests for accommodations and medical leave before terminating
Grodman. See, e.g., Am. Complaint at ¶ 43. In fact, Texas Tech admits that its termination decision
would have been the same.
Fourth, the Amended Complaint alleges, and attaches evidence showing, that Texas Tech
did not follow its own standards in terminating Grodman, and greatly deviated from its standard
disciplinary and academic protocol. See Am. Complaint at ¶ 50 (“Under Defendant[’s] procedures,
a resident is required to be given at least sixty days (60) after probation before termination is
considered so that the resident can show improvement.”). Here, Texas Tech terminated Grodman
only 18 days after allegedly placing Grodman under Probation and completely ignoring
Grodman’s request for accommodations due to his disability (a fact which Defendant has
admitted).
Fifth, the Amended Complaint alleges that even the actual reasons cited by Texas Tech in
connection to its termination (and by Texas Tech’s Response [ECF No. 16]at pg. 3) can be directly
traced to symptoms of Grodman’s disabilities—symptoms Texas Tech was aware about but had

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previously told Grodman “not to worry” about. Am. Complaint at ¶ 41 (“In fact, Defendant’s
January 4, 2022, termination letter admits that Defendant’s decision was based on Grodman’s
conduct arising from his disabilities.”); id at ¶ 24 (“Defendant, by and through Kaylani, represented
to Grodman that no such accommodations were necessary, and that the results of the internal
examinations were for educational purposes only and that those scores “would never be used
against [Grodman].”).
Sixth, the Amended Complaint alleges that the prior observation period taken against
Grodman was based solely on his disabilities. See Ex. H to Am. Compl. [ECF No. 14-1].
Moreover, this prior (resolved) probation was wrongfully used in connection with Grodman’s
termination. See, e.g., Am. Complaint at Ex. I (Letter removing Grodman from Observation); see
id at ¶ 42 (“Moreover, Defendant falsified the documentation relating to Grodman’s ultimate
termination, omitting the important fact that Grodman had been removed from a prior observation
over 18 months prior to his probation.”); see also Exs. H-I, M-N.
Finally, Texas Tech repeatedly misrepresented and hid the ongoing termination
proceedings from Grodman, and ultimately the basis of his termination. See Am. Complaint at ¶
38 (“Defendant deliberately and willfully ignored Grodman’s disabilities, requests for
accommodations, and had predetermined to terminate Grodman almost two weeks before ever
placing Grodman under probation[.]”).
As outlined here, Grodman’s Amended Complaint asserts more than sufficient facts, and
attaches sufficient evidence, that would allow for the reasonable inference that Grodman’s
disability was the sole reason Texas Tech terminated Grodman. Accordingly, the Court should
find that Grodman pleaded sufficient facts to state a discrimination claim under the Rehabilitation
Act, especially to survive the low pleading standard applicable at this procedural phase.

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B. Grodman Sufficiently Pleads a Failure to Accommodate Claim Under The
Rehabilitation Act.
The prima facie case for Plaintiff’s failure to accommodate claim under the Rehabilitation
Act entails showing that (1) Plaintiff is an otherwise qualified individual with a disability; (2) the
disability and its limitations were known by Defendant; and (3) Defendant failed to make
reasonable accommodations for Plaintiff’s known limitations. Feist v. La., Dep’t of Justice, Office
of the Attorney Gen., 730 F.3d 450, 452 (5th Cir. 2013).
1. Grodman has sufficiently pleaded that he is an otherwise qualified individual with a
disability and that his disability was known by Texas Tech.
An “otherwise qualified” individual with a disability means: (1) an individual with a
disability who can perform the essential functions of the job in question with or without reasonable
accommodations. Shaikh v. Tex. A&M Univ. College of Med., 739 Fed. Appx. 215, 220 (5th Cir.
2018). A person is “disabled” where they: have a “physical or mental impairment that substantially
limits one or more major life activities”; have a record of such impairment; or are regarded as
having such an impairment. Greene v. Potter, 240 Fed. Appx. 657, 659 (5th Cir. 2007). Grodman
alleged sufficient facts to plausibly plead that he was an “otherwise qualified” individual with a
“disability.” Grodman alleges that he has a “disability” in fact; by record of his impairment; and
that he was regarded as having a disability by Texas Tech. Grodman alleges that he suffered from
a mental impairment that substantially limited several major life activities. Greene, 240 Fed. Appx.
657 at 659; see Am. Complaint at ¶¶ 14-18.
Grodman’s Amended Complaint also outlines Texas Tech’s awareness of Grodman’s
disabilities and his limitations. ¶¶ 21-27. See, e.g., Am. Complaint, Ex. C (Bhaskaran’s response
to Kaylani’s request to initiate disciplinary proceedings stating “I vote Yes to proceed with
probation/termination. We have made enough and more accommodations for him than any
program would have.” (emphasis added)). Indeed, Texas Tech initially provided a series of
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informal accommodations, but ultimately declined to provide Grodman the reasonable
accommodations he requested. Am. Complaint at ¶¶ 31-34.
2. Grodman has sufficiently pleaded that Texas Tech failed to make reasonable
accommodations for his known limitations.
Grodman has sufficiently pleaded that Texas Tech failed to make reasonable
accommodations for his known limitations. For example, Grodman alleges that Texas Tech
withdrew the informal accommodations to manufacture a basis on which to terminate him. Am.
Compl. at ¶¶ 25 (listing informal accommodations); 31-34 (alleging inter alia Texas Tech
“withdrew the informal accommodations to manufacture a basis on which to terminate
Grodman.”). Texas Tech knew that these informal accommodations were necessary, and that
Grodman has successfully completed two years of his residency while utilizing the
accommodations.
Texas Tech admits that Grodman made formal and informal requests for accommodations,
and only argues that it had no duty to consider Grodman’s request for accommodations. Response
at 4-8 [ECF No. 16]. Therefore, Grodman has sufficiently pleaded facts as to each of the elements
necessary to establish a prima facie case for failure to accommodate under the Rehabilitation Act.
Thus, the Court should find that Grodman sufficiently pleads allegations underlying his claim for
failure to accommodate pursuant to the Rehabilitation Act at this procedural phase. Fed. R. Civ.
P. 8(a)(2); 15(a)(2).
C. Grodman Sufficiently Pleads a Procedural Due Process Claim Seeking Prospective
Injunctive Relief.
The Fourteenth Amendment provides that no person shall be deprived “of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. Amend. XIV, § 1. Procedural due process
ensures that state actors utilize the required and fair procedures before they can deprive someone
of a life, liberty, or property interest. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332(1976). Thus, a
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prerequisite to stating a procedural due process claim is that a life, liberty, or property interest be
at stake. See Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569–71(1972).
1. Eleventh Amendment immunity does not bar Grodman’s procedural due process claims
seeking prospective, equitable relief against Texas Tech.
Importantly, Grodman’s Amended Complaint seeks reinstatement—prospective injunctive
relief, and not monetary damages— against Texas Tech. See Nelson v. Univ. of Texas at Dallas,
535 F.3d 318, 322 (5th Cir.2008) (“this circuit has always treated Ex parte Young as an appropriate
vehicle for pursuing reinstatement to a previous” position); see also Shurb v. Univ. of Texas Health
Sci. Ctr. at Houston-Sch. of Med., 2013 WL 4096826, at *8 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 13, 2013) (“The Court
finds that to the extent the plaintiff seeks reinstatement to the University, that would qualify as
prospective injunctive relief, and such a claim may proceed against the University and individual
defendants in their official capacities.”) (emphasis added).
Furthermore, “a request for reinstatement[,]” as sought by Grodman here, “is sufficient to
bring a case within the Ex parte Young exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity, as it is a
claim for prospective relief intended to end a continuing violation of federal law.” Nelson v. Univ.
of Tex., 535 F.3d 318, 324 (5th Cir. 2008). See also Caldwell v. Medina, No. 1:19-CV-524-RP,
2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 126138, at *12 (W.D. Tex. 2020); Corn v. Miss. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 954
F.3d 268, 276 (5th Cir. 2020) (citing Warnock v. Pecos Cty., 88 F.3d 341, 343 (5th Cir. 1996))
(“In Warnock v. Pecos Cty., we stated that the Ex parte Young doctrine was an appropriate vehicle
for pursuing reinstatement to a previous job position – as the case here.”). Because Grodman’s
due process claims satisfy Ex parte Young, Plaintiff respectfully requests the Court grant its Motion
for Leave as to Grodman’s procedural due process claims.

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2. Grodman has sufficiently alleged a constitutionally protected property and liberty
interest.
“Procedural due process imposes constraints on governmental decisions which deprive
individuals of ‘liberty’ or ‘property’ interests within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment.” Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332, 96 S. Ct. 893, 47 L.
Ed. 2d 18 (1976), Shah v. Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Sch., 54 F. Supp. 3d 681, 691 (N.D. Tex. 2014).
A finding that Grodman has a constitutional protected interest in his employment and postgraduate education with Texas Tech would fall in line with other opinions in this circuit and across
the United States. In Board of Curators of University of Missouri v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 98 S.
Ct. 948, 55 L. Ed. 2d 124 (1978), the Supreme Court of the United States assumed, without
deciding, that students have some protected interest in public higher education. Id. at 84-86
(assuming that medical student had been deprived of liberty or property interest when she was
dismissed from medical school and considering merits of procedural due process claim). The Fifth
Circuit has made the same assumption in cases decided after Horowitz. In Shaboon the court
assumed without deciding, that the medical resident had protected due process interest in his
position. Shaboon v. Duncan, 252 F.3d 722, 730 (5th Cir. 2001). In Davis the court assumed the
existence of a liberty or property interest in his dental residency. Davis v. Mann, 882 F.2d 967,
973 (5th Cir. 1989). In a public university setting, the level of procedural protection that students
are due varies according to whether they were dismissed for disciplinary or academic reasons.
Shah v. Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Sch., 129 F. Supp. 3d 480, 498 (N.D. Tex. 2015). It is clear, and
undisputed, that Plaintiff was dismissed for disciplinary reasons.
3. Grodman has sufficiently alleged that Texas Tech denied him a meaningful opportunity
to be heard.
A university’s decision to dismiss a student based on academic grounds may only be
overturned by a court “if there was no rational basis for the university's decision, or if the decision
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was motivated by bad faith or ill will unrelated to academic performance.” Ikpeazu v. University
of Nebraska, 775 F.2d 250, 253 (8th Cir.1985) (citing Hines v. Rinker, 667 F.2d 699, 703 (8th
Cir.1981)); see Eiland v. Wolf, 764 S.W.2d 827, 833 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1989, writ
denied); Gaspar v. Bruton, 513 F.2d 843, 851 (10th Cir.1975); Wilkenfield v. Powell, 577 F.Supp.
579, 583 (W.D.Tex.1983). Even when a student is dismissed for disciplinary reasons, the
Fourteenth Amendment requires that “the student be given oral or written notice of the charges
against him and, if he denies them, an explanation of the evidence the authorities have and an
opportunity to present his side of the story.” Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 581, 95 S. Ct. 729, 42
L. Ed. 2d 725 (1975); Shah v. Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Sch., 54 F. Supp. 3d 681, 692 (N.D. Tex.
2014).
Here, Grodman alleges that Texas Tech, in bad faith, manufactured a basis to terminate
him when there was none, and never truly afforded him a change to be heard. See, e.g., Am.
Complaint [ECF No. 14-1] at ¶¶ 88, 90 (“Grodman did, and still does, challenge the truth and
integrity of Texas Tech’s termination process, which was spearheaded by Kaylani, and its
dismissal recommendation by the Committee, which was made without the Committee even
considering Grodman’s request for accommodations. As such, these actions were taken without
cause and were arbitrary and capricious.”).
In other words, Grodman alleges that he was not given a meaningful opportunity to be
heard due to a bad faith “manufactured” termination that did not give him a legitimate opportunity
to be heard. There is no difference between failing to provide a due process hearing and providing
one but ignoring the outcome. Am. Compl. at ¶ 54 (“Defendant and Committee members have
even admitted that they did not consider Grodman’s timely request in their decision to fire him
and didn’t even have copies of his request during their final meeting regarding Grodman’s

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termination. Even weeks before suspending Grodman, the Committee expressed unwillingness to
consider accommodations or to even consider that his undermedication of Grodman’s disability
played any role in his issues.”) (emphasis added). Texas Tech pursued disciplinary proceedings
against Grodman, and failed to follow its policies and procedures, and undertook a process that
was wholly outside of the bounds of discipline issued to other residents for comparative
disciplinary issues. Grodman was not provided with the due process required, and despite.
Regardless, as courts must indulge all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff at this
phase of the litigation, Defendants’ disputed conclusions do not warrant this Court’s dismissal of
Grodman’s procedural due process claims under Rule 12(b)(6).
V.

PLAINTIFF’S REQUEST FOR LEAVE TO AMEND

In the event this Court determines Grodman has failed to properly state a claim upon which
relief may be granted and thereby moves to grant the relief requested in Texas Tech’s Response,
the dismissal should be without prejudice, and Grodman should be granted leave to amend.
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a), leave to amend should be freely given when
justice so requires and should be granted absent some justification for refusal. Forman v. Davis,
371 U.S. 178, 83 S. Ct. 227, 230, 9 L.Ed.2d 222 (1962). This decision is within the “sound
discretion” of the district court, but the request should not be denied under Rule 15(a) “unless there
is a substantial reason to do so.” Mailing and Shipping Sys, Inc. v. Neopost USA, Inc., 292 F.R.D.
369, 376 (W.D. Tex. 2013); Leffall v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 28 F.3d 521, 524 (5th Cir. 1994)).
As a matter of equity, Rule 15(a) favors giving leave to amend. See Iron Oak Tech., LLC v. Dell,
Inc., 2018 WL 1631396, at *2 (W.D. Tex. Apr. 4, 2018); Lyn–Lea Travel Corp. v. Am. Airlines,
283 F.3d 282, 286 (5th Cir. 2002).

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Plaintiff has not previously sought to amend his Complaint. Allowing Plaintiff to file an
amended complaint would serve justice and promote judicial efficiency. Further, there would be
no substantial or undue hardship, prejudice, bad faith, undue delay, or futility by granting Plaintiff
leave to amend.
VI.

CONCLUSION

For all the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court grant Plaintiff’s
Motion for Leave to File First Amended Complaint [ECF No. 14].

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Date: January 11, 2024

Respectfully Submitted,
/s/ Jeffrey M. Tillotson
Jeffrey M. Tillotson
State Bar No. 20039200
jtillotson@tillotsonlaw.com
Enrique Ramirez-Martinez
State Bar No. 24122158
eramirez@tillotsonlaw.com
TILLOTSON JOHNSON & PATTON
1201 Main Street, Suite 1300
Dallas, Texas 75202
(214) 382-3041 Telephone
(214) 292-6564 Facsimile
ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned hereby certifies that the foregoing was electronically filed with the Clerk
of the Court using the CM/ECF system on January 11, 2024.
/s/ Jeffrey M. Tillotson
Jeffrey M. Tillotson

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