RESPONSE filed by Schyler Grodman re: 23 MOTION to Dismiss Plaintiff's Amended Complaint (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order) (Ramirez-Martinez, Enrique)¶

Grodman v. Texas Tech University Health Sciences Center, No. 5:23-cv-00210 (N.D. Tex.) · Dkt. 27 · 2024-03-18 · PDF

Text extracted from the PDF; scanned pages were read by OCR. The PDF is the authoritative copy.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
LUBBOCK DIVISION
SCHYLER Z. GRODMAN, M.D.,
Plaintiff,
v.
TEXAS TECH UNIVERSITY HEALTH
SCIENCES CENTER and SAMER ZAIDKAYLANI, M.D.,
Defendants.

§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§

Civil Action No. 5:23-cv-00210-H

PLAINTIFF’S RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S
PARTIAL MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S AMENDED COMPLAINT
Plaintiff Schyler Z. Grodman, M.D. (“Plaintiff” or “Grodman”) hereby files this Response
in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint (the “Response”),
and in support thereof shows as follows:
I.

INTRODUCTION

Dr. Samer Zaid Kaylani (“Defendant” or “Kaylani”) moves to dismiss Grodman’s due
process claim against Kaylani in his individual capacity pursuant to Section 1983. [ECF No. 23].
Kaylani presents several arguments for why Kaylani believes that Grodman’s due process claim
should be dismissed. First, Kaylani argues that Grodman’s claim is “not cognizable” for two
independent reasons: (1) Grodman cannot obtain any of the relief he seeks from Dr. Zaid Kaylani;
and (2) Grodman’s claim is barred by qualified immunity. Id. at 3. Kaylani further argues that
“Grodman’s claim against Dr. Zaid Kaylani is barred by qualified immunity, because he lacked a
clearly established constitutionally-protected interest in his continued residency enrollment, and

1

even if such a right were to exist, he received more procedural protection than constitutionally
required, in the form of ample notice and a hearing.” Id. at 9.
For the reasons outlined below, each of these arguments fails. Despite Kaylani’s
arguments, this Court has jurisdiction to address Grodman’s claims against Kaylani, and
Grodman’s First Amended Complaint contains more-than-sufficient factual allegations to state
plausible claims for relief against Kaylani. Kaylani thus cannot satisfy the high bars for dismissal
required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). As a result, this Court should deny the
motion.
II.

BACKGROUND

Grodman has been diagnosed with attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (“ADHD”),
Autism Spectrum Disorder, depression, and social anxiety. Am. Compl. [ECF No. 14-1] at ¶ 14.
These disabilities substantially limit one or more of his major life activities. Id. at ¶¶ 15-16. Despite
these disabilities, and with reasonable accommodations, Grodman successfully completed an
undergraduate program, a masters program, and medical school. Id. at ¶¶ 17-18.
Texas Tech hired Grodman to work in its Pediatric Residency Program in 2019. Id. at ¶ 19.
Texas Tech was aware of Grodman’s disabilities, and—during the first two years of his
residency—provided him with informal accommodations. Id. at ¶¶ 21-27. In Grodman’s final year
of residency, however, Texas Tech (at the decision of Kaylani) fully discontinued the
accommodations. Id. at ¶¶ 31-34. In December of 2021, after Kaylani accused Grodman of taking
an insufficient dosage of ADHD medication, Texas Tech (by and through Kaylani) expeditiously
placed Grodman on probation, suspended him, and soon-after terminated him. Id. at ¶ 35.
Defendant Kaylani and Texas Tech did so despite Grodman’s formally requesting

2

accommodations, including medical leave to adjust his medications, prior to his termination. Id. at
¶¶ 35, 43.
As a result, on September 7, 2023, Grodman filed his Original Complaint [ECF No. 1],
alleging violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), Texas Commission on Human
Rights Act (“TCHRA”), and Rehabilitation Act for various discriminatory and improper acts.
Texas Tech filed a Partial Motion to Dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) on October 4, 2023 [ECF No.
5], alleging that sovereign immunity barred Grodman’s ADA and TCHRA claims.
On December 4, 2023, Grodman filed a Motion for Leave to File First Amended
Complaint, in order to withdraw two claims for discrimination and retaliation under the ADA and
TCHRA and to add a procedural (not substantive) due process claim against Kaylani, the director
of the residency program, and against Texas Tech, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. [ECF No. 14].
Grodman’s Amended Complaint sought reinstatement, expungement of probation, and release of
academic records. Am. Compl. [ECF No. 14-1] at 31.
III.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Kaylani moves to dismiss Grodman’s procedural due process claim against Kaylani
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is inappropriate “unless the [C]ourt
determines that it is beyond doubt that [Grodman] cannot prove a plausible set of facts that support
[his] claim[s] and would justify relief.” Id. (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
556 (2007)). Because of that, “a motion to dismiss under 12(b)(6) is viewed with disfavor and is
rarely granted.” Turner v. Pleasant, 663 F.3d 770, 775 (5th Cir. 2011) (internal quotations and
citations omitted). To that end, “to survive [Kaylani’s] Rule 12(b)(6) motion,” Grodman’s
complaint “‘does not need detailed factual allegations,’ but must provide [Grodman’s] grounds for
entitlement to relief—including factual allegations that when assumed to be true ‘raise a right to

3

relief above the speculative level.’” Cuvillier v. Taylor, 503 F.3d 397, 401 (5th Cir. 2007) (quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). And in assessing the motion, the Court must “construe [the] facts in
the light most favorable to [Grodman as the] nonmoving party.” Turner, 663 F.3d at 775.
IV.

ARGUMENTS AND AUTHORITIES

A. Grodman Sufficiently Pleaded a Procedural Due Process Claim Seeking Prospective
Injunctive Relief from Kaylani.
The Court should reject Kaylani’s attempts to dismiss Grodman’s claims for procedural
due process violations. The Fourteenth Amendment provides that no person shall be deprived “of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. Procedural
due process ensures that state actors utilize the required and fair procedures before they can deprive
someone of a life, liberty, or property interest. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976).
Consequently, federal courts employ a two-step process in assessing violations of
procedural due process rights: “The first question asks whether there exists a liberty or property
interest which has been interfered with by the State; the second examines whether the procedures
attendant upon that deprivation were constitutionally sufficient.” Meza v. Livingston, 607 F.3d
392, 399 (5th Cir. 2010) (internal quotations and citations omitted). The answer to the first question
here is “yes,” and the answer to the second is “no.” Grodman has thus stated a plausible claim for
relief.
Importantly, Grodman sufficiently pled facts supporting a finding that Kaylani is necessary
for effecting and enforcing the equitable and prospective injunctive relief sought by Grodman in
this case, including “reinstatement, expungement of probation, further alterations of his records,
and the release of his academic records” relief which Defendant Kaylani admits is sought here.
[ECF No. 23] at 3. For example, as to Grodman’s requested relief of “further alterations of his
records, and the release of his academic records” Kaylani and Dr. Herrick are the only individuals

4

in possession of the positive letters written by Kayalani and Dr. Herrick at the end of Grodman’s
second year at Texas Tech. Am. Compl. [ECF. No. 14-1] at ¶ 27. These letters are necessary to
support Grodman’s candidacy for a post-graduation pediatric fellowship. Id.
Grodman has further alleged that Kaylani, in this individual capacity, continued to take
actions to effect Grodman’s termination, even as late as October 2022. See Am. Compl. [ECF No.
14-1] at ¶ 62 (“Upon information and belief, this notice [sent to the American Board of Pediatrics]
had been sent by Kaylani, informing Grodman that he will have limited time to complete a
residency, otherwise the completed two and half years of his residency would be null and void.”).
Thus, as a preliminary matter, the Court should find that Kaylani is a necessary Defendant to effect
the relief which Grodman seeks, and should deny Kaylani’s motion to dismiss.
1. Sovereign immunity does not bar Grodman’s procedural due process claims seeking
prospective, equitable relief against Texas Tech.
At the outset, this Court should reject Kaylani’s contention that the Eleventh Amendment
bars Grodman’s procedural due process claims. Kaylani ignores a vital point in arguing for
sovereign immunity: Grodman is seeking reinstatement—not monetary damages. And it is wellestablished that, pursuant to Ex parte Young, sovereign immunity does not bar claims seeking
reinstatement. See, e.g., Nelson v. Univ. of Texas at Dallas, 535 F.3d 318, 324 (5th Cir. 2008)
(“[A] request for reinstatement is sufficient to bring a case within the Ex parte Young exception to
Eleventh Amendment immunity, as it is a claim for prospective relief designed to end a continuing
violation of federal law.”).
That applies to Grodman’s claims against both Kaylani and Texas Tech. See, e.g., Harrison
v. Young, 48 F.4th 331, 338 (5th Cir. 2022) (confirming that an employee “fired because of her
disability” could “sue the state seeking reinstatement”); see also Shurb v. Univ. of Texas Health
Sci. Ctr. at Houston-Sch. of Med., 2013 WL 4096826, at *8 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 13, 2013) (permitting

5

plaintiff to seek reinstatement through claims “against the University and individual defendants in
their official capacities”). Because “the Ex parte Young doctrine [is] an appropriate vehicle for
pursuing reinstatement to a previous job position—as [is] the case here”—sovereign immunity
does not bar Grodman’s due-process claims. Corn v. Miss. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 954 F.3d 268, 276
(5th Cir. 2020).
2. Grodman has sufficiently alleged a constitutionally protected property and liberty
interest.
Kaylani further errs in insinuating that Grodman lacks a constitutionally protected property
and liberty interest. Indeed, a finding (or, at a minimum, an assumption) that Grodman has such
an interest in his employment and post-graduate education with Texas Tech would align with other
opinions in this circuit and across the United States.
For instance, in Board of Curators of University of Missouri v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78
(1978), the Supreme Court assumed, without deciding, that students have some protected interest
in public higher education. Id. at 84-86 (assuming that medical student had been deprived of liberty
or property interest when she was dismissed from medical school and considering merits of
procedural due process claim). The Fifth Circuit has made similar assumptions in cases decided
after Horowitz. For example, in Shaboon v. Duncan, 252 F.3d 722, 730 (5th Cir. 2001), the court
assumed without deciding that a medical resident had a protected due process interest in his
position. In Davis v. Mann, 882 F.2d 967, 973 (5th Cir. 1989), the court similarly assumed the
existence of a liberty or property interest in a party’s dental residency.
The Court should thus find—or at least assume at this preliminary procedural stage—that
Grodman has a constitutionally protected interest at stake.

6

3. Grodman has sufficiently alleged that Kaylani was individually involved in ensuring
that Texas Tech denied Grodman constitutionally sufficient procedures.
The Court should also find that Grodman sufficiently pleaded that Defendants Kaylani and
Texas Tech did not provide “constitutionally sufficient” procedures to protect his constitutional
interests. “In a public university setting, the level of procedural protection that students are due
varies according to whether they were dismissed for disciplinary or academic reasons.” Shah v.
Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Sch., 129 F. Supp. 3d 480, 498 (N.D. Tex. 2015), aff’d, 668 F. App’x 88
(5th Cir. 2016).
Kaylani argues that Grodman’s procedural due process claim against Kaylani should be
dismissed because “academic actions” against residents like Grodman require only “minimum
procedure” and that Kaylani and Texas Tech met that standard here. However, a university’s
decision to dismiss a student based on academic grounds may only be overturned by a court “if
there was no rational basis for the university’s decision, or if the decision was motivated by bad
faith or ill will unrelated to academic performance.” See e.g., Ikpeazu v. University of Nebraska,
775 F.2d 250, 253 (8th Cir. 1985); see Eiland v. Wolf, 764 S.W.2d 827, 833 (Tex. App.—Houston
[1st Dist.] 1989, writ denied); Gaspar v. Bruton, 513 F.2d 843, 851 (10th Cir.1975); Wilkenfield
v. Powell, 577 F. Supp. 579, 583 (W.D. Tex.1983). Conversely, when a student is dismissed for
disciplinary reasons, the Fourteenth Amendment requires that “the student be given oral or written
notice of the charges against him and, if he denies them, an explanation of the evidence the
authorities have and an opportunity to present his side of the story.” Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565,
581 (1975); Shah, 129 F. Supp. 3d at 498.
Here, Grodman plausibly alleged facts showing that his dismissal fell within the second,
more protected category (i.e., for disciplinary reasons). For example, the probation letter given to
Grodman on December 17,2021—12 days after the vote instigated by Kaylani to place Grodman

7

on “probation with a path to termination,” stated the major elements that Grodman needed to
improve were test scores. See Am. Compl. at ¶ 37. Moreover, Grodman alleged that Kaylani and
Texas Tech wrongfully used a prior (resolved) observation period taken against Grodman to
terminate Grodman, and that this prior period of observation was based solely on his disabilities
and academic performance. See Ex. H to Am. Compl. [ECF No. 14-1]. Moreover, this prior
(resolved) probation was wrongfully used in connection with Grodman’s termination. See, e.g.,
Am. Compl. at Ex. I (Letter removing Grodman from Observation); see id. at ¶ 42 (“Moreover,
Defendant falsified the documentation relating to Grodman’s ultimate termination, omitting the
important fact that Grodman had been removed from a prior observation over 18 months prior to
his probation.”); see also Exs. H-I, M-N.
Thus, despite Kaylani’s attempts to reframe Grodman’s dismissal (which Kaylani himself
spearheaded) as an “academic” one, see [ECF No. 22] at 6-7, Grodman’s “disciplinary” dismissal
entitled him not only to notice of the “charges against him,” but also “an explanation of the
evidence” against him and an “opportunity to present his side of the story.” E.g., Shah, 129 F.
Supp. 3d at 498. Grodman plausibly alleged he did not receive that here.
Instead, Grodman alleged that Kaylani, in bad faith, manufactured a basis to terminate him
when there was none, and never truly afforded him a chance to be heard—and in fact that Kaylani
misled Grodman about the ongoing adverse proceedings against him. See, e.g., Am. Compl. [ECF
No. 14-1] at ¶¶ 88, 90 (“Grodman did, and still does, challenge the truth and integrity of Texas
Tech’s termination process, which was spearheaded by Kaylani, and its dismissal recommendation
by the Committee, which was made without the Committee even considering Grodman’s request
for accommodations. As such, these actions were taken without cause and were arbitrary and

8

capricious.”). In other words, Grodman alleged that he was not given a meaningful or legitimate
opportunity to be heard due to a bad faith “manufactured” termination.
In his Motion to Dismiss, Kaylani makes the argument that Grodman was “afforded a
hearing.” [ECF No. 23] at 8. But there is no difference between failing to provide a due process
hearing and providing a hearing in name only after already determining the outcome—as Kaylani
and Texas Tech did here. Am. Compl. at ¶ 54 (“Defendant and Committee members have even
admitted that they did not consider Grodman’s timely request in their decision to fire him and
didn’t even have copies of his request during their final meeting regarding Grodman’s termination.
Even weeks before suspending Grodman, the Committee expressed unwillingness to consider
accommodations or to even consider that his undermedication of Grodman’s disability played
any role in his issues.”) (emphasis added). Kaylani, as the director of Texas Tech, pursued
disciplinary proceedings against Grodman, failed to follow the university’s own policies and
procedures, and undertook a process that was wholly outside of the bounds of discipline issued to
other residents for comparative disciplinary issues. And just as Kaylani had planned and hoped,
Grodman was not provided the requisite procedural due process.
The Court should reject Kaylani’s motion to dismiss Grodman’s claim for procedural due
process against Kaylani.
V.

CONCLUSION

For all the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff Schyler Z. Grodman respectfully requests that the
Court deny Defendant Dr. Samer Zaid Kaylani’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s First Amended
Complaint [ECF No. 23].

9

Date: March 18, 2024

Respectfully Submitted,
/s/ Jeffrey M. Tillotson
Jeffrey M. Tillotson
State Bar No. 20039200
jtillotson@tillotsonlaw.com
Enrique Ramirez
State Bar No. 24122158
eramirez@tillotsonlaw.com
TILLOTSON JOHNSON & PATTON
1201 Main Street, Suite 1300
Dallas, Texas 75202
(214) 382-3041 Telephone
(214) 292-6564 Facsimile
ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned hereby certifies that the foregoing Original Complaint and Jury Demand
was electronically filed with the Clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF system on March 18, 2024.
/s/ Jeffrey M. Tillotson
Jeffrey M. Tillotson

10