MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER: The Court issued a prior Order granting in full Texas Tech's motion for summary judgment (Dkt. No. 44) and denying as moot Texas Tech's¶

Grodman v. Texas Tech University Health Sciences Center, No. 5:23-cv-00210 (N.D. Tex.) · Dkt. 63 · 2025-12-29 · PDF

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
LUBBOCK DIVISION
SCHYLER GRODMAN,
Plaintiff,
v.

No. 5:23-CV-210-H

TEXAS TECH UNIVERSITY HEALTH
SCIENCES CENTER,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Schyler Zane Grodman was a student in the Pediatric Residency Program at Texas
Tech University Health Sciences Center. As part of that program, he was required to
demonstrate competent patient care and professionalism while progressing towards practice
as an independent physician. After several dangerous mistakes that jeopardized the health
and safety of his patients, Texas Tech recommended Grodman for termination. He claimed
that his shortcomings stemmed from his disabilities, including attention deficit hyperactivity
disorder, autism, depression, and social anxiety. But Texas Tech still upheld his
termination. Grodman then sued, bringing failure-to-accommodate and retaliation claims
under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.
The Court issued a prior Order granting in full Texas Tech’s motion for summary
judgment (Dkt. No. 44) and denying as moot Texas Tech’s Daubert motions and the parties’
joint motion for a continuance (Dkt. Nos. 42; 43; 58). Dkt. No. 61. The Court now issues
this Memorandum Opinion and Order explaining its decisions. In short, Grodman fails to
satisfy the threshold element of his failure-to-accommodate claim—that he is a “qualified
individual” who can perform the program’s essential functions with or without a reasonable

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accommodation. Nor can Grodman show that he made a qualifying request for
accommodations that was denied or that his disabilities, their resulting limitations, and the
necessary reasonable accommodation were open, obvious, and apparent. On Grodman’s
retaliation claim, he cannot make out the prima facie case, let alone rebut Texas Tech’s
legitimate, nondiscriminatory justifications for his termination or show that his termination
was pretextual. Thus, Texas Tech is entitled to full summary judgment, and the Court need
not resolve Texas Tech’s objections to Grodman’s experts.
1.

Factual and Procedural Background
A.

Factual Background
i.

Texas Tech’s Pediatric Residency Program

Texas Tech University Health Sciences Center—a state-supported institution that is
part of the Texas Tech University System—offers a three-year Pediatric Residency Program.
See Dkt. No. 45-1 at 443–76. The curriculum is designed to “prepare residents to be
competent general pediatricians” who can serve as “leaders in the organization and
management of patient care.” Id. at 445 (emphasis omitted). Along those lines, residents
are expected to acquire proficiency in six “competencies,” including professionalism,
medical knowledge, and interpersonal skills. Id. at 371–77, 448. These competencies are
tested through regular in-service exams. Id. at 447–48.
Residents take on more responsibility during each year of the program. See id. at
450–54. By the third year of training (PL3), residents assume a “supervisory role.” Id. at
454. PL3s must be able to “function as an independent clinician,” meaning they can
“manage simple to complex problems” and “directly assess day-to-day patient care.” Id. at
106, 347, 454. If a PL3 cannot independently practice medicine (or satisfy any of several

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other requirements, like demonstrating satisfactory communication skills), then he or she
does not meet the criteria to graduate from the program. See id. at 455.
Each resident is evaluated twice per year by the Clinical Competency Committee
(CCC)—a group of faculty members who, along with the Program Director, assess a
resident’s progress toward certain milestones. Id. at 389, 448. In making recommendations
concerning remedial work, contract renewal, and promotion, the CCC looks to various
materials, including evaluations from a resident’s attending physician, in-service exam
scores, and procedure logs. Id. at 448. Final decisions on the CCC’s recommendations lie
with the Program Director. Id.
ii.

Grodman’s Disabilities and Early Residency

When he was a child, Schyler Zane Grodman was diagnosed with attention deficit
hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), autism, depression, and social anxiety. Dkt. No. 51 at 7
¶¶ 3, 4. These ongoing conditions substantially limit Grodman’s major life activities. Id.
For example, because of his ADHD, Grodman struggles with “managing small details and
accomplishing tasks in the allotted amount of time.” Id.
Despite these challenges, Grodman obtained his undergraduate and medical degrees
from Ivy League institutions. Id. at 8 ¶ 5. He received accommodations throughout his
schooling, including extra time on standardized tests and licensing exams. Id.
Grodman’s academic career continued in July 2019 when he began his pediatric
residency at Texas Tech’s Amarillo campus. Id. As a resident, Grodman coordinated
patient care and participated in “all aspects of pediatric patient treatment.” Id.
Upon joining the program, Grodman began working closely with Dr. Samer ZaidKaylani, the program’s now-former director. See Dkt. No. 45-1 at 47–48, 54. According to

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Grodman, he disclosed his disabilities to multiple faculty members—including
Dr. Kaylani—during his first year with the program. Id. at 5; Dkt. No. 51 at 8. The
evidence on that front is mixed. Grodman’s mentor, Dr. Shannon Herrick, testified that
Grodman told her about his ADHD during his first year. Dkt. No. 45-1 at 283, 285.
Grodman also alluded to concerns that “he had autism when he was little,” but that “he no
longer had it.” Id. at 285. Dr. Angela Huang, a professor who supervised Grodman during
a clinical rotation, recalled Grodman sharing that he has autism and ADHD. Dkt. No. 51
at 550–51. Dr. Kaylani, for his part, has a different recollection. He maintains that
Grodman did not disclose his ADHD until his third year, long after reporting that he had
“outgrown” his autism as a child. Dkt. No. 45-1 at 54–55, 103.
Still, it is undisputed that Texas Tech made some informal accommodations for
Grodman’s disabilities during his early years in the program. Compare Dkt. No. 50 at 15
(Grodman claiming that Texas Tech “provided informal accommodations, indicating its
awareness of [his] disabilities and needs”), with Dkt. No. 45 at 24 (Texas Tech noting that
the “undisputed record shows that [the program] was providing ‘accommodations’—
feedback, mentorship, oversight, supervision[,] etc.—to assist [Grodman] in performing his
job duties”). For instance, Dr. Kaylani gave Grodman double time on exams administered
by the program. Dkt. No. 45-1 at 104. And Dr. Kaylani approved that accommodation
despite apparently telling Grodman that the program’s exams were for “educational
purposes only” and that the scores would never be used against him. Dkt. No. 51 at 8 ¶ 11.
Even with the informal accommodations, Grodman’s early performance in the
program was hit or miss. At times, Grodman was successful. He was twice promoted, and
faculty members wrote him positive recommendations for fellowship programs. Id. at 9

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¶ 13, 73–75. But he also struggled. In his first year, Grodman was placed on observation
because of concerns about his “medical knowledge, professionalism competency, system
based competency, patient care, practice based learning, and interpersonal skill[s].” Id. at
32–34. Grodman completed all remedial measures, however, and the CCC later removed
him from observation, albeit with close monitoring. Id. at 39; Dkt. No. 45-1 at 136.
Grodman’s second-year performance was also inconsistent. Evaluations from
faculty members show some improvement. See Dkt. No. 45-1 at 129–35. One supervisor,
for example, applauded Grodman’s support for a family with a child in hospice care. Id. at
130–31. But most assessments were less complimentary. An attending physician,
describing Grodman’s patient-management practices, warned of “a medicolegal disaster
waiting to happen.” Id. at 133. And another resident emailed Dr. Kaylani to report
Grodman’s apparent disdain for chronically ill children, who he reportedly called
“headache[s].” Id. at 139. Throughout this period, Dr. Kaylani and other faculty members
assisted Grodman with getting professional counseling, all while he accounted for 40% of
patient and nursing complaints. Id. at 126–27, 141. Still, the CCC promoted Grodman to
the third and final year of the program. See id. at 599.
iii.

Grodman’s Final Year of Residency

Grodman’s final year got off to a rocky start. After returning to Amarillo from a
summer rotation in Dallas, Grodman tore his Achilles tendon playing soccer. Dkt. No. 51
at 201. He claims that he was “not offered or provided any formal plan of remediation or
support” after his injury. Id. at 9 ¶ 16. Text messages from Dr. Kaylani and Dr. Herrick
rebut this account. Both told Grodman that they were available if he needed “[a]nything at
all” after surgery; Dr. Kaylani offered to arrange transportation to get Grodman home from

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the hospital, if needed. Id. at 345–46. Dr. Kaylani also modified Grodman’s schedule to
aid in his recovery, which included several months of physical therapy. Id. at 76.
During this period, Grodman applied for post-residency fellowship programs. Id. at
201–02. He interviewed nine times but was ultimately unsuccessful. Id. The all-consuming
stress from the fellowship search, combined with the physical challenges from the Achilles
injury, admittedly “impact[ed] [Grodman’s] ability to perform.” Id. at 9.
The problems came to a head on December 4, 2021. See Dkt. No. 45-1 at 77. That
evening, Grodman made several errors while on call. See Dkt. No. 51 at 77–79. First,
Grodman did not follow Dr. Kaylani’s instructions and failed to order fluids and antibiotics
for a “very sick” child. Id. at 78. It was not until a second-year resident identified
Grodman’s mistake that Dr. Kaylani returned to the hospital and found the child in shock.
Id. The child was immediately moved to the pediatric intensive care unit, where she
received multiple urgent transfusions. Id.
During the same shift, Grodman failed to reevaluate a different patient who was
admitted with severe dehydration. Id. at 78–79. Grodman limited another child to
“maintenance only,” even though the child was vomiting bile and had a possible intestinal
obstruction. Id. at 79. According to Dr. Kaylani, these incidents were not unusual. In the
weeks leading up to the December 4 shift, Grodman entered seizure medication for a child
that was four times greater than his prescribed dose. (A nurse later caught the mistake and
prevented the medication from being refilled.) Id. And before that, Grodman tried to
forcefully retract a two-week-old baby’s foreskin over the mother’s repeated objections. Id.
These incidents led Dr. Kaylani to label Grodman a “dangerous resident.” Id.

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Texas Tech’s Disciplinary Actions Against Grodman

The next day, Dr. Kaylani called for the CCC to hold an urgent vote to place
Grodman on immediate probation with “possible eventual decision for termination.” Id. at
81–83. The committee agreed, noting the program’s repeated efforts to accommodate
Grodman, his lack of improvement, and the committee’s general concerns about the safety
of Texas Tech’s patients. See id. at 77, 84. Here is how one faculty member described his
thinking: “Whether [Grodman’s failings are] due to a medical issue, psychiatric issue, or
severe personality deficit, I don’t know and honestly don’t care at this stage.” Id. at 84.
Grodman was such a “poison pill,” the faculty member continued, that he would diminish
fellowship prospects for other Texas Tech residents. Id. Grodman maintains that he was
unaware of these discussions at the time. Id. at 9 ¶ 18.
A few days later, on December 10, Grodman met with Dr. Kaylani to discuss his
performance. See, e.g., id. at 9 ¶ 19; Dkt. No. 45-1 at 83–84. According to Grodman, this
meeting was “incredibly hostile.” Dkt. No. 45-1 at 12. Dr. Kaylani accused Grodman of
“having senioritis,” and when Grodman said that he was adjusting his ADHD medication,
Dr. Kaylani asserted that he was “a doctor who doesn’t believe in medicine.” Dkt. No. 51
at 300. At his deposition, Dr. Kaylani admitted that he “raise[d] [his] voice” during the
meeting. Dkt. No. 45-1 at 85. But he only did so after Grodman apparently said that he did
not “want those poisons in [his] body,” nor did he “want people to be telling [him] what to
do” in counseling. Id. Dr. Kaylani testified that these statements were the final straw; after
the December 10 meeting, he began making formal arrangements to put Grodman on
probation. Id. at 84–85. Again, and despite Dr. Kaylani’s claims to the contrary, Grodman

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contends that he was unaware at this point that disciplinary actions were under
consideration. Id. at 89–90; Dkt. No. 51 at 9 ¶ 19.
A week later, on December 17, Grodman was notified via letter that he had been
placed on probation. Dkt. No. 51 at 88. The letter explained that probation was necessary
because of, among other things:
[Grodman’s] failure to adequately remediate areas of academic deficiencies
noted in prior corrective action plans; failure to meet the objectives expected
for a third-year resident; [his] performance presents a serious comprise [sic] to
acceptable standards of patient care; . . . fail[ure] to progress satisfactorily in
fund [sic] knowledge, skill acquisition[,] and professional development; and
[his] unprofessional conduct.
Id. Regarding patient care, the letter described multiple “major red flags”—including the
December 4 episodes—that “could have placed the patients in real morbid situations.” Id.
It also gave a list of “Probation Objectives,” which listed areas and ways that Grodman
could improve over the three-month probationary period. Id. at 89–90. Lastly, the letter
noted that, “during this period of probation and evaluation,” “any unsafe patient practice or
unprofessional incidents may result in the recommendation that [he] be dismissed
immediately from [the] program.” Id. at 90.
Despite this notice, Grodman continued to display questionable judgment. Just five
days after being placed on probation, Grodman failed to order antibiotics for an infant
admitted with fever, bronchiolitis, and vomiting. Dkt. No. 45-1 at 433. He also placed
orders on the wrong patient (though he later recognized the mistake) and would only leave
the resident sign-out room when asked a question. Id. at 434.
Following these incidents, Grodman was suspended on December 23. Dkt. No. 51
at 91. According to the suspension letter, Grodman was found to have “violated the terms
of [his] ‘Probation Objectives’ outlined in the letter provided to [him] on December 17.” Id.

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The letter further stated that “concerns exist that the performance of [his] duties are
seriously compromised or may constitute a danger to patients.” Id. The program planned
to investigate the matter within 30 days and then determine how to proceed. Id.
During this period, Grodman sent a letter to the CCC, dated December 27, 2021,
wherein he admitted that he “should have requested accommodations for [his] disability.”
Id. at 95. The letter goes on to describe what Grodman viewed as the roots of his problems,
including insufficient medication to address his ADHD and related anxiety. Id.
Notwithstanding Grodman’s pleas for leniency, the CCC unanimously voted to
recommend his termination on January 4, 2022. See Dkt. No. 45-1 at 158–61. Around the
same time, Grodman submitted his first formal request for accommodations. Dkt. No. 51 at
100–04. His application identified his disabilities and explained how those impairments
adversely affected his performance as a resident. Id. at 102. As for specific
accommodations, Grodman requested extra time on exams, opportunities to see a
counselor, and personalized support to address “specific performance concerns.” Id. at 103.
The CCC did not learn of the request until, at the earliest, January 5, the day after it voted
to recommend Grodman’s termination. Id. at 110–11; see Dkt. No. 45-1 at 170.
On January 7, Grodman received from Dr. Kaylani a formal notice of
recommendation for dismissal. Dkt. No. 51 at 113–14. The letter outlined Grodman’s
repeated clinical failures throughout his time in the program, including his inability to
satisfy his specific “Probation Objectives” for improvement. Id. at 113. Dr. Kaylani
explained that the CCC investigated the events leading up to Grodman’s suspension and, at
the January 4 meeting, “found that [his] conduct constituted a danger to patients and
violated the terms of [his] probation status.” Id. at 114. The CCC therefore recommended

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to the Dean of the School of Medicine that Grodman be dismissed from the program and
that he be removed from all duties involving patient care pending a final decision. Id.
Grodman appealed the termination internally. See id. at 199–230. The program’s
review board recommended approving the dismissal. Id. at 237. On February 24, the Dean
issued a formal notice terminating Grodman from the program. Id. at 238.
B.

Procedural Background

Sometime after these events, Grodman filed a charge of discrimination with the U.S.
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). Id. at 239–49; see Smith v. Potter,
400 F. App’x 806, 811 (5th Cir. 2010) (noting the administrative exhaustion requirements
for Rehabilitation Act claims). The EEOC later issued Grodman a right-to-sue letter
informing him that it would not proceed with its investigation. Dkt. No. 21 at 34.
Within 90 days of receiving the EEOC’s letter, Grodman filed this lawsuit against
Texas Tech alleging violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), the Texas
Commission on Human Rights Act (THCRA), and the Rehabilitation Act. See Dkt. No. 1.
The Rehabilitation Act claims were premised on two theories of liability: failure to
accommodate and retaliation. Id. ¶ 75.
Texas Tech moved to dismiss the ADA and THCRA claims as barred under the
Eleventh Amendment. Dkt. No. 5. Grodman tried to amend his complaint, but the Court
struck the amended complaint for failure to comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
15(a). Dkt. Nos. 10; 13.
Soon after, Grodman moved for leave to file his amended complaint. Dkt. No. 14.
The Court granted his motion over Texas Tech’s objection and denied the original motion
to dismiss as moot. Dkt. Nos. 16; 19; 20. Grodman’s amended complaint added

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Dr. Kaylani as a defendant, dropped the ADA and THCRA claims, and asserted a new
procedural due process claim against both defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Compare
Dkt. No. 21, with Dkt. No. 1. Each defendant moved to dismiss the amended complaint.
See Dkt. Nos. 22; 23. The Court stayed discovery while the motions were pending because
each defendant raised an immunity defense. Dkt. Nos. 22 at 8; 23 at 3; 30.
The Court granted in part and denied in part Texas Tech’s motion to dismiss. See
Dkt. No. 33. The Court dismissed the procedural due process claim because Texas Tech is
immune from suit under Section 1983. Id. at 11–13 (citing Wallace v. Tex. Tech Univ., 80
F.3d 1042, 1047 n.3 (5th Cir. 1996)). Even so, the Court determined that Grodman pled a
viable failure-to-accommodate claim under the Rehabilitation Act. Id. at 16–21. And
because Texas Tech did not move to dismiss Grodman’s retaliation claim, the Court
allowed the case to proceed on that claim, too. Id. at 16 & n.10. Lastly, the Court
dismissed the procedural due process claim against Dr. Kaylani—this time for lack of
standing—because Dr. Kaylani could no longer provide Grodman relief as he was no longer
the Program Director. Id. at 13–16.
After resolving the motions to dismiss, the Court lifted the discovery stay. Dkt. No.
37 at 12. A year later, Texas Tech moved for summary judgment on the two remaining
Rehabilitation Act claims. Dkt. No. 44. It also moved to exclude the expert testimony of
Gregory Care—a lawyer who represents doctors in disciplinary proceedings—and Stephen
Nicholas—an admissions official at Columbia University’s medical school. Dkt. Nos. 42–
43; 46 at 2; 47 at 1. Grodman responded to all three motions (Dkt. Nos. 50; 52; 53), and
Texas Tech replied (Dkt. Nos. 55–57).

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2.

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Legal Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate when “the movant shows that there is no genuine

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “A genuine dispute of material fact exists if a reasonable jury could
enter a verdict for the non-moving party.” Doe v. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist., 964 F.3d 351,
358 (5th Cir. 2020). The moving party “bears the initial responsibility of demonstrating the
absence of a genuine issue of material fact,” Jones v. United States, 936 F.3d 318, 321 (5th
Cir. 2019) (internal omission and alteration omitted) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477
U.S. 317, 323 (1986)), and “identifying those portions of [the record] which it believes
demonstrate [that] absence.” Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323.
In evaluating a summary-judgment motion, the Court draws all reasonable
inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Darden v. City of Fort Worth,
880 F.3d 722, 727 (5th Cir. 2018). However, “the mere existence of some alleged factual
dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for
summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact.”
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247–48 (1986) (emphasis in original). “A fact
‘is material if its resolution could affect the outcome of the action.’” Dyer v. Houston, 964
F.3d 374, 379 (5th Cir. 2020) (quoting Sierra Club, Inc. v. Sandy Creek Energy Assocs., L.P., 627
F.3d 134, 134 (5th Cir. 2010)). The Court must consider materials cited by the parties, but it
may also consider other materials in the record. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3).
“Where the nonmovant bears the burden of proof at trial, the movant may merely
point to an absence of evidence, thus shifting to the non-movant the burden of
demonstrating by competent summary judgment proof that there is an issue of material fact

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warranting trial.” Lyons v. Katy Indep. Sch. Dist., 964 F.3d 298, 301–02 (5th Cir. 2020)
(quoting In re La. Crawfish Producers, 852 F.3d 456, 462 (5th Cir. 2017)). The movant,
however, does not need to “negate the elements of the nonmovant’s case.” Austin v. Kroger
Tex., L.P., 864 F.3d 326, 335 (5th Cir. 2017) (emphasis in original) (quoting Little v. Liquid
Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc)). “If the moving party fails to meet
[its] initial burden, the motion must be denied, regardless of the nonmovant’s response.”
Pioneer Expl., L.L.C. v. Steadfast Ins. Co., 767 F.3d 503, 511 (5th Cir. 2014) (quoting Kee v. City
of Rowlett, 247 F.3d 206, 210 (5th Cir. 2001)).
When the moving party has met its burden, “the nonmoving party cannot survive a
summary judgment motion by resting on the mere allegations of its pleadings.” Duffie v.
United States, 600 F.3d 362, 371 (5th Cir. 2010). Rather, the nonmovant must identify
specific evidence in the record and articulate how the evidence supports its claim. Willis v.
Cleco Corp., 749 F.3d 314, 317 (5th Cir. 2014); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A). “This
burden will not be satisfied by ‘some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts, by
conclusory allegations, by unsubstantiated assertions, or by only a scintilla of evidence.’”
Boudreaux v. Swift Transp. Co., 402 F.3d 536, 540 (5th Cir. 2005) (quoting Little, 37 F.3d at
1075). Additionally, Rule 56 does not impose a duty on the Court to “sift through the
record in search of evidence” to support the nonmovant’s opposition to the motion for
summary judgment. Ragas v. Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co., 136 F.3d 455, 458 (5th Cir. 1998)
(quoting Skotak v. Tenneco Resins, Inc., 953 F.2d 909, 915–16 & n.7 (5th Cir. 1992)).
“A failure on the part of the nonmoving party to offer proof concerning an essential
element of its case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial and mandates a finding that
no genuine issue of fact exists.” Adams v. Travelers Indem. Co. of Conn., 465 F.3d 156, 164

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(5th Cir. 2006). If the nonmoving party “fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the
existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the
burden of proof at trial,” summary judgment must be granted. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at
322–23. “Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for
the non-moving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.’” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v.
Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (quoting First Nat’l Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv.
Co., 391 U.S. 253, 288 (1968)).
3.

Analysis
The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 sets out “a comprehensive federal program” to

protect the rights of Americans with disabilities. Consol. Rail Corp. v. Darrone, 465 U.S. 624,
626 (1984); see Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355. To that end, Section 504 of the Act
prohibits federally funded programs from discriminating based on disability. Similar to
Title II of the ADA, Section 504 provides that no “otherwise qualified” individual with a
disability “shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the participation
in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity
receiving Federal financial assistance.”1 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). Texas Tech, as a recipient of
federal funds, must comply with Section 504’s guarantees. See Dkt. No. 35 ¶ 65; Miller v.
Tex. Tech Univ. Health Scis. Ctr., 421 F.3d 342, 348–50 (5th Cir. 2005) (en banc) (holding that
Texas Tech waived immunity from suit under Section 504 by accepting federal funds).

1

Title II of the ADA extends the Rehabilitation Act’s requirements to public entities that may not
receive federal funding, including private employers. See 42 U.S.C. § 12131(1). The only “material
difference” between Section 504 and Title II is their “respective causation requirements.” J.W. v.
Paley, 81 F.4th 440, 449 (5th Cir. 2023) (quotation omitted). Under Section 504, a plaintiff’s
disability must be the “sole reason” for the discrimination; Title II’s standard is less rigorous. Id.;
see 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). Otherwise, given the similarities between the statutes, case law interpreting
either statute applies to both. Delano-Pyle v. Victoria County, 302 F.3d 567, 574 (5th Cir. 2002).

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Section 504 is enforceable through an implied private right of action. Frame v. City of
Arlington, 657 F.3d 215, 224 (5th Cir. 2011) (en banc). To prevail under Section 504, a
plaintiff must show that he was (1) an “individual with a disability”; (2) “otherwise
qualified” for the program; and (3) excluded from, denied the benefits of, or otherwise
subjected to discrimination under the program “solely by reason of her or his disability.”
See Hileman v. City of Dallas, 115 F.3d 352, 353 (5th Cir. 1997) (quoting § 794(a)).
Along with prohibiting outright discrimination, the “Rehabilitation Act impose[s]
upon public entities an affirmative obligation to make reasonable accommodations for
disabled individuals.” Bennett-Nelson v. La. Bd. of Regents, 431 F.3d 448, 454 & n.11 (5th Cir.
2005); see Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 531 (2004) (observing that “failure to
accommodate persons with disabilities will often have the same practical effect as outright
exclusion”). That obligation comes from Section 504’s implementing regulations, which
require federal funding recipients to “make reasonable accommodation to the known
physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified handicapped applicant or
employee,” unless it would pose an “undue hardship” for the recipient’s program or
activity. 28 C.F.R. § 42.511(a). Reasonable accommodations may include, among other
things, “job restructuring” and “part-time or modified work schedules.” Id. § 42.511(b).
Grodman also brings a distinct claim for retaliation. Although Section 504 does not
specifically refer to retaliation, the Fifth Circuit permits such claims based on regulations
that bar “retaliation for opposing any practice made unlawful by . . . the Rehabilitation
Act.” Shannon v. Henderson, No. 01-10346, 2001 WL 1223633, at *3 (5th Cir. Sept. 25,
2001) (omission in original) (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1614.101 (2000)). Moreover, the
Rehabilitation Act provides that the standards for employment discrimination under Section

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504 are the same as those under the ADA, which expressly prohibits retaliation for
protected conduct. See 29 U.S.C. § 794(d); 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a). Because retaliation is
prohibited against “any individual, whether handicapped or not,” 28 C.F.R.
§ 42.503(b)(1)(vii), a plaintiff may maintain a retaliation claim regardless of whether he can
prove disability discrimination. See D.B. ex rel. Elizabeth B. v. Esposito, 675 F.3d 26, 40–41
(1st Cir. 2012).
The Court address each claim in turn.
A.

Failure to Accommodate

To prevail on a failure-to-accommodate claim under the Rehabilitation Act, a
plaintiff must prove: “(1) he is a qualified individual with a disability; (2) the disability and
its consequential limitations were known by the covered entity; and (3) the entity failed to
make reasonable accommodations.” Ball v. LeBlanc, 792 F.3d 584, 596 n.9 (5th Cir. 2015).
The law “does not require clairvoyance.” Windham v. Harris County, 875 F.3d 229, 236 (5th
Cir. 2017) (quotation omitted). As such, “the burden falls on the plaintiff ‘to specifically
identify the disability and resulting limitations,’ and to request an accommodation in ‘direct
and specific’ terms.” Id. at 237 (first quoting Taylor v. Principal Fin. Grp., Inc., 93 F.3d 155,
165 (5th Cir. 1996); then quoting Reed v. LePage Bakeries, Inc., 244 F.3d 254, 261 (1st Cir.
2001)). An employee’s timely accommodation request “triggers the employer’s obligation
to participate in [an] interactive process” to identify an appropriate accommodation. Cutrera
v. Bd. of Sup’rs of La. State Univ., 429 F.3d 108, 112 (5th Cir. 2005).
When a plaintiff fails to timely request an accommodation, “he can prevail only by
showing that ‘the disability, resulting limitation, and necessary reasonable accommodation’
were ‘open, obvious, and apparent’ to the entity’s relevant agents.” Windham, 875 F.3d at

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237 (quoting Taylor, 93 F.3d at 164). The “open, obvious, and apparent” standard is a
“narrow exception” to the default rule that “‘[i]f the [plaintiff] fails to request an
accommodation, the [public entity] cannot be held liable for failing to provide one.’” Id. at
239 (quoting Taylor, 93 F.3d at 165) (alterations in original). Put differently, where the
limitations and necessary accommodations for a disability are uniquely within an
employee’s knowledge, it is not the employer’s duty to identify and suggest an appropriate
accommodation. See Taylor, 93 F.3d at 165.
i.

Grodman was not a “qualified individual.”

Because there is no genuine factual dispute that Grodman could not independently
practice medicine with or without a reasonable accommodation, he was not “qualified” to
continue as a resident in the program. See Ball, 792 F.3d at 596 n.9. That conclusion alone
resolves Grodman’s failure-to-accommodate claim.
The “qualified individual” requirement recognizes that an employer is not wedded to
a disabled employee who cannot satisfy basic job requirements. See Se. Cmty. Coll. v. Davis,
442 U.S. 397, 405 (1979). As the Fifth Circuit recently explained, a “‘qualified individual’
under the Rehabilitation Act ‘means an individual who, with or without reasonable
accommodation, can perform the essential functions of’ [his] position.” Harmon v. Collier,
158 F.4th 595, 609 (5th Cir. 2025) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8)). Under the statute,
“consideration shall be given to the employer’s judgment as to what functions of a job are
essential, and if an employer has prepared a written description before advertising or
interviewing applicants for the job, this description shall be considered evidence of the
essential functions of the job.” Id. (quoting § 12111(8)). Texas Tech maintains that

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Grodman was not “qualified” to continue as a resident because he “indisputably” failed to
provide safe, independent patient care. Dkt. No. 45 at 26.
Before turning to the evidence, the Court must define the “essential functions” of
Grodman’s position. As a third-year resident, Grodman was expected to “[a]ssume a
supervisory role” and “function as an independent clinician.” Dkt. No. 45-1 at 454.
Independent practice “includes the ability to manage simple to complex problems as well as
directly assess day-to-day patient care.” Id. No doubt, independent practice is an
“essential” function for a program designed to produce “competent general pediatricians”
who can serve as “leaders in the organization and management of patient care.” Id. at 445
(emphasis omitted); see Shaikh v. Tex. A&M Univ. Coll. of Med., 739 F. App’x 215, 220 (5th
Cir. 2018) (“A requirement is ‘essential’ if ‘the nature of the program would be
fundamentally altered’ without it.” (quoting Mary Jo C. v. N.Y. State & Local Ret. Sys., 707
F.3d 144, 158 (2d Cir. 2013))). In fact, no resident may complete the program without
demonstrating proficiency in independent patient care. See Dkt. No. 45-1 at 455.
Against this backdrop, there is no genuine dispute of material fact that Grodman was
incapable of practicing medicine independently. The record is chock-full of situations in
which Grodman failed to safely diagnose and treat pediatric patients. See, e.g., Dkt. Nos.
45-1 at 433–34; 51 at 77–79. The December 4 episode is just one example. Recall that
Grodman failed to order fluids for a “very sick” child despite Dr. Kaylani’s instructions—an
error that was eventually caught by a less-experienced resident and which required moving
the child to the intensive care unit. Dkt. No. 51 at 78. On other occasions, Grodman
entered the wrong seizure medication for a patient and forcefully retracted the foreskin of
another without the mother’s consent. Id. at 79. Grodman accepted “full responsibility” for

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his clinical errors, labeling at least one as an “honest mistake” and others as “failure[s] to
follow up.” Id. at 97. So, by Grodman’s own admission, he failed to provide safe and
independent clinical care. That is, he did not satisfy the program’s “essential functions.”
There is no evidence that an accommodation in the clinical setting would have
allowed Grodman to safely practice medicine independently. See McGregor v. La. State Univ.
Bd. of Sup’rs, 3 F.3d 850, 855 (5th Cir. 1993) (explaining that a student may still be
“qualified” if they complete academic requirements “with the aid of reasonable
accommodations”). If anything, the record reflects Grodman’s desire for even greater
oversight, feedback, supervision, and mentorship—all of which Texas Tech already
provided in abundance. See Dkt. Nos. 45-1 at 110–11, 153–56; 51 at 229 (Grodman
explaining that he “would benefit” from personalized meetings before and during rotations,
along with mentorship and “regular, real-time and formative feedback on [his]
performance”). That Grodman continued to make potentially deadly mistakes despite
regular oversight underscores his inability to perform the program’s “essential functions.”
Besides, it would not be a “reasonable” accommodation to give Grodman additional
oversight in the clinical environment. See McGregor, 3 F.3d at 855. Again, the point of the
program is to develop physicians who can render independent care; the program’s graduates
are themselves supposed to be “leaders” in patient management. Dkt. No. 45-1 at 445. An
accommodation that provides Grodman with additional supervision—or that gives him
time off to seek counseling and adjust his medication (see Dkt. No. 51 at 103)—does not
advance those programmatic goals. See Fuller v. Frank, 916 F.2d 558, 562 (9th Cir. 1990)
(reasonable accommodation does not necessarily include awaiting the results of uncertain
treatment). As the Supreme Court has made clear, Section 504 does not “compel

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educational institutions” like Texas Tech “to make substantial modifications in their
programs to allow disabled persons to participate.” Se. Cmty. Coll., 442 U.S. at 405; see
Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 300–01 (1985) (same). Demanding an accommodation
that undercuts Grodman’s ability to independently practice medicine would do just that.
Lastly, there is no dispute that Grodman’s conduct posed a “safety risk” to his
patients. Turco v. Hoechst Celanese Corp., 101 F.3d 1090, 1094 (5th Cir. 1996). That too
renders him “unqualified” under Fifth Circuit precedent. Id. The Fifth Circuit has
reiterated that the law “does not require an employer to accommodate an individual if the
employee would pose a direct threat to the health and safety of others.” Robertson v.
Neuromedical Ctr., 161 F.3d 292, 296 (5th Cir. 1998) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12113(b)). Given the
abundant evidence of Grodman’s dangerous mistakes, “any accommodations in this case
would be unjustified from the standpoint of the basic medical safety of [his] patients.” Id.
Put another way, there is no genuine factual dispute that Grodman was “unqualified.” He
could not meet the program’s most basic requirements—providing safe and independent
medical care—even with a reasonable accommodation.
Grodman’s rebuttal is unpersuasive. See Dkt. No. 50 at 25–26. He highlights his
impressive educational background, as well as some indications that he showed gradual
improvement during his first two years in the program. Id. Those metrics are beside the
point. Although Grodman made some progress in his early residency, it does not follow
that he satisfied the program’s essential functions during his third and final year, which
entailed greater responsibility and expectations. See Dkt. No. 45-1 at 454–55. Plus,
academic degrees do not necessarily make someone “qualified” under the Rehabilitation
Act. The question is whether they can perform the essential functions of their position with

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or without a reasonable accommodation. See Harmon, 158 F.4th at 609. On this record,
there is no genuine dispute that Grodman failed to meet that bar.
ii.

Grodman did not make a qualifying request for accommodations
that was denied.

Apart from the “qualified individual” analysis, there is no genuine dispute of
material fact that (1) Grodman’s formal request for accommodations in January 2022 was
untimely, and (2) that while Grodman made earlier requests for extra time on in-service
exams, those requests were not denied.
Again, it is the employee’s burden “to request an accommodation in ‘direct and
specific’ terms.” Windham, 875 F.3d at 237 (quoting Reed, 244 F.3d at 261). The employee
must “specifically identify the disability and resulting limitations.” Patton v. Jacobs Eng’g
Grp., Inc., 874 F.3d 437, 444 (5th Cir. 2017) (quoting EEOC v. Chevron Phillips Chem. Co., LP,
570 F.3d 606, 621 (5th Cir. 2009)). “Although the employee need not utter any magic
words, [he] ‘must explain that the adjustment in working conditions or duties [he] is seeking
is for a medical condition-related reason.” Id. (quoting Chevron Phillips, 570 F.3d at 621).
Grodman did not formally request accommodations until January 4, 20222—the
same day that the CCC voted to recommend his termination to the Dean based on his
deficient patient care. Dkt. Nos. 45-1 at 158–61; 51 at 101. It is undisputed that the CCC
did not learn of the request until the next day. Dkt. No. 51 at 110–11; see Dkt. No. 45-1 at
170. At that point, Grodman’s formal request for accommodations was “too little, too
late.” Reed, 244 F.3d at 262 n.9. In situations like this one, where termination based on a
“legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason” like the failure to provide safe patient care “has been

2

The form lists January 3 as the date of the request. Dkt. No. 51 at 100. However, Grodman did
not sign the form until January 4. Id. at 101.

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made effective but has not yet been processed, courts must not permit the employee to use
the [law] as a shield from being fired by suddenly requesting an accommodation before the
ink on [his] valid termination papers is dry.” Green v. Medco Health Sols. of Tex., LLC, 947
F. Supp. 2d 712, 729 (N.D. Tex. 2013), aff’d, 560 F. App’x 398 (5th Cir. 2014). Grodman
had over two years to formally request accommodations through the program. He failed to
do so. Then, once termination became a possibility, Grodman admitted that he “should
have requested accommodations for [his] disability.” Dkt. No. 51 at 95. Therefore,
Grodman’s belated formal request did not “trigger[] [Texas Tech’s] obligation” to help
identify an appropriate accommodation. Cutrera, 429 F.3d at 112.
It is less clear whether Grodman’s earlier appeals for extra time on in-service exams
constitute timely requests for accommodations and, if so, whether those requests were
denied. In his declaration, Grodman maintains that he requested extra time on the exams.
Dkt. No. 51 at 8 ¶ 10. Dr. Kaylani apparently told Grodman that the program’s
examinations were for “educational purposes only” and that the scores would never be used
against him. Id. ¶ 11. Even so, the letter placing Grodman on probation identified his low
test scores as a “major issue[] of concern.” Id. at 88; see id. at 113–14 (termination letter
noting the deficiencies in “medical knowledge” that led to Grodman’s probation); see also
Dkt. No. 33 at 19 (Court’s order denying Texas Tech’s motion to dismiss because Grodman
did not allege a “harmless denial of an accommodation”). Thus, as Grodman’s argument
goes, Texas Tech refused his request for extra time on in-service exams and then used his
poor performance on those same exams as a reason for his termination. Dkt. No. 50 at 22.
This argument is not supported by the record. Dr. Kaylani testified at his deposition
that he did in fact give Grodman double the amount of time on exams administered by

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Texas Tech. Dkt. No. 45-1 at 104; see id. at 100. Grodman does not point to evidence
rebutting this testimony. His own declaration (in which Grodman claims that Dr. Kaylani
downplayed the importance of the in-service exams) does not contend that any request for
extra time was actually denied. Dkt. No. 51 at 8 ¶ 11. And, in any event, Grodman’s
termination letter focuses on his deficient patient care, not his exam performance.3 See id. at
113–14. In the end, Grodman’s assertion that “Texas Tech denied [his] request for extra
time on exams” rings hollow. Dkt. No. 50 at 22.
Viewed most charitably, Grodman may be referring to in-service exams administered
by the American Board of Pediatrics (ABP), not Texas Tech. See id. at 23. It does not
appear that Grodman received extra time on those exams. See id. But here too Grodman’s
case stumbles. The ABP oversees accommodation requests for its exams; the residency
location is not responsible for approving accommodations. Dkt. No. 45-1 at 105, 417–21.
In an email exchange, Dr. Kaylani offered to assist Grodman with applying for
accommodations through the ABP, and he specifically asked Grodman to provide the
program with the necessary documents. Dkt. No. 51 at 53. Grodman never provided the
documentation to support his request for accommodations. Dkt. No. 45-1 at 105. “Where
an employee refuses to provide such documentation, [the Fifth Circuit has] held that he

3

Relatedly, Texas Tech argues that Grodman lacks standing to advance his failure-to-accommodate
claim based on the program’s purported failure to provide him extra time on exams. Dkt. No. 45
at 24–25. As Texas Tech frames the issue, because Grodman’s termination was based on his
deficient patient care, “he cannot demonstrate any injury fairly traceable to [the program’s] alleged
failure to provide him extra time to complete any exam.” Id. at 24; see also Baker v. Univ. of Tex.
Health Sci. Ctr. Hous., No. H-08-1908, 2011 WL 1549263, at *4 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 21, 2011) (“[T]he
plaintiff is obligated to show, by competent evidence, that the defendants’ violation of [Section
504] proximately caused [his] actual injury before [he] can recover.”). The Court does not reach
this issue—both because there is no genuine factual dispute as to whether Grodman was a
“qualified individual,” and because Grodman has offered no evidence to rebut Texas Tech’s
showing that the program did provide him with extra time on exams that it administered.

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causes a breakdown in the interactive process that may preclude an employer’s liability.”
Delaval v. PTech Drilling Tubulars, L.L.C., 824 F.3d 476, 482 (5th Cir. 2016). There is a
reason why the process is “interactive”—it requires the input of the employee as well as the
employer. Loulseged v. Azko Nobel Inc., 178 F.3d 731, 735–36 (5th Cir. 1999). And when a
breakdown in the process “is traceable to the employee,” id., the employer cannot be found
to have violated the law. Griffin v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 661 F.3d 216, 224 (5th Cir. 2011).
So, to the extent that Grodman premises his failure-to-accommodate claim on his inability
to obtain extra time for the ABP testing, that result is not attributable to Texas Tech.
In sum, there is no genuine and material factual dispute about whether Grodman
timely requested accommodations from the program. Grodman’s formal request for
accommodations was too late, and to the extent he sought accommodations on in-service
exams, those requests were either not refused or could only be granted by the ABP.
iii.

The “open, obvious, and apparent” exception did not apply.

Having failed to timely request a reasonable accommodation, Grodman can prevail
only if he satisfies the “open, obvious, and apparent” exception. As noted, this “narrow
exception” is limited to those situations where the employer clearly would have known of
the employee’s “disabilities, limitations, and necessary accommodations” absent any
notification from the employee. Windham, 875 F.3d at 239. The Fifth Circuit has explained
that, “‘[w]hen dealing in the amorphous world of mental disability,’ it will often be
impossible for an employer to identify an employee’s specific disabilities, limitations, and
possible accommodations.” Jin Choi v. Univ. of Tex. Health Sci. Ctr. at San Antonio, 633
F. App’x 214, 216 (5th Cir. 2015) (alternation in original) (quoting Taylor, 93 F.3d at 165).
“To prevail, [a plaintiff] must adduce evidence that all three were or should have been

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obvious.” Windham, 875 F.3d at 238 (quoting Taylor, 93 F.3d at 165). Grodman fails to
make that showing.
Here, there is a fact dispute about whether the program was aware of Grodman’s
disabilities early in his tenure. Grodman maintains that he disclosed his disabilities during
his first year. Dkt. Nos. 45-1 at 5; 51 at 8 ¶ 9. Dr. Herrick corroborated that account (Dkt.
No. 45-1 at 283, 285), as did Dr. Huang (Dkt. No. 51 at 550–51). But Dr. Kaylani claimed
that Grodman did not disclose his ADHD until his third year—after he had reported
“outgrow[ing]” his autism as a child. Dkt. No. 45-1 at 54–55, 103.
This dispute is immaterial. Even if Grodman could show that the program was
aware of his disabilities, it does not follow that the program would have been aware of his
limitations and possible accommodations. See Taylor, 93 F.3d at 164 (“[I]t is important to
distinguish between an employer’s knowledge of an employee’s disability versus an
employer’s knowledge of any limitations experienced by the employee as a result of that
disability.”). The distinction is critical: federal law “requires employers to reasonably
accommodate limitations, not disabilities.” Id. There is no indication that the specific
accommodations that would allow Grodman to adequately serve in the clinical
environment were obvious to Texas Tech. See Dkt. No. 51 at 95 (Grodman admitting after
being put on probation that he should have requested accommodations). And Texas Tech
was not required to “disregard” Grodman’s disabilities or compromise its expectations for
third-year residents just so Grodman could continue to provide patient care that—by all
accounts—was dangerous. Se. Cmty. Coll., 442 U.S. at 405.
At bottom, Grodman has not pointed to evidence showing that Texas Tech was
obviously aware of specific accommodations that would eliminate any concerns about his

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patient care. At most, he identifies statements from program administrators indicating that
they were aware of his disabilities and, perhaps, his accompanying limitations. Dkt. No. 50
at 19–20. But that is not enough. Windham, 875 F.3d at 238. Thus, the Court concludes
that no rational jury could find that the “open, obvious, and apparent” exception applied.
For that reason, too, the Court grants summary judgment to Texas Tech on Grodman’s
failure-to-accommodate claim.
B.

Retaliation

That leaves Grodman’s retaliation claim. In evaluating retaliation claims under the
Rehabilitation Act, the Fifth Circuit applies the burden-shifting framework from McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). See, e.g., Houston v. Tex. Dep’t of Agric., 17 F.4th
576, 585 (5th Cir. 2021); Shannon, 2001 WL 1223633, at *3.
Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, a plaintiff must first establish a prima facie
case of retaliation. Cohen v. Univ. of Tex. Health Sci. Ctr., 557 F. App’x 273, 277 (5th Cir.
2014). The prima facie case has three elements: (1) the employee engaged in an activity
protected by the Rehabilitation Act; (2) his employer took an adverse employment action
against him; and (3) a casual connection existed between the adverse employment action
and the protected activity. Calderon v. Potter, 113 F. App’x 586, 592 (5th Cir. 2004).
Although it is not dispositive, Mooney v. Lafayette Cnty. Sch. Dist., 538 F. App’x 447, 454 (5th
Cir. 2013), temporal proximity between the protected activity and the adverse employment
action is often used to establish the casual connection for the prima facie case of retaliation.
See, e.g., Milteer v. Navarro County, 652 F. Supp. 3d 754, 766–67 (N.D. Tex. 2023). Typically,
for a plaintiff to meet his initial burden based on temporal proximity, the protected activity

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and adverse action must be “very close” in time. See Lyons, 964 F.3d at 305 (quoting Clark
Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 273 (2001)).
If a plaintiff makes out a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant to
articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its adverse employment action.
Calderon, 113 F. App’x at 592. Once the defendant offers such a reason, “the burden shifts
back to the plaintiff to show that the adverse action would not have occurred ‘but for’ the
protected activity.” Id. (citing Long v. Eastfield Coll., 88 F.3d 300, 308 (5th Cir. 1996)).
i.

There is an absence of evidence establishing a prima facie case of
retaliation.

Grodman’s retaliation claim stumbles at the first step of the McDonnell Douglas
framework. True, Grodman engaged in protected activity by seeking formal and informal
accommodations, and the program took adverse employment actions by (among other
things) placing him on probation and ultimately terminating him. See, e.g., Tabatchnik v.
Cont’l Airlines, 262 F. App’x 674, 676 (5th Cir. 2008). But on the third prong of the prima
facie case, no rational jury could find based on the summary-judgment evidence that there
was a causal connection between Grodman’s requests and the program’s adverse actions.
Here, temporal proximity is key. According to Grodman, he informally requested
accommodations as early as his first year in the program. Dkt. No. 51 at 8 ¶¶ 10, 12; see
Dkt. No. 45-1 at 15. The adverse employment actions did not begin, however, until
December 2021, well into Grodman’s third year. See, e.g., Dkt. No. 51 at 88–90. That gap
in time is too vast to establish a casual connection between Grodman’s informal requests
and the adverse employment actions. See, e.g., Harmon, 158 F.4th at 615 (“[A] temporal gap
of around seven months, without more, is insufficient.”).

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Grodman’s request for formal accommodations does not change the analysis.
Although the request and the CCC’s decision to recommend Grodman’s termination were
close in time, the CCC was not aware of the request until after it made its decision. The
CCC voted to recommend Grodman’s termination on January 4, 2022. Dkt. No. 45-1 at
158–61. Grodman intimated earlier that he would formally request accommodations. Dkt.
No. 51 at 98. However, the CCC did not learn of the actual request until January 5, the day
after it made its recommendation to the Dean. Id. at 110–11; see Dkt. No. 45-1 at 170.
Thus, Grodman’s formal request cannot be viewed as the impetus for the CCC’s
termination recommendation. Without more, Grodman’s claim cannot proceed.
ii.

Texas Tech has met its burden to demonstrate legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions.

Even if there were fact issues about whether Grodman has established a prima facie
case of retaliation, there is no genuine dispute that Texas Tech has provided legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reasons for Grodman’s adverse employment actions. In fact, Grodman
hardly contests this point. His brief offers two conclusory sentences supporting the assertion
that Texas Tech has not met its burden under McDonnell Douglas. See Dkt. No. 50 at 30–31.
It is no wonder why. The record describes a litany of uncontested patient-care failures and
unprofessional incidents that formed the basis for Grodman’s termination. See, e.g., Dkt.
Nos. 45-1 at 433–34; 51 at 77–79. And Grodman’s termination letter makes clear that he
was being recommended for dismissal based on poor patient care and unprofessional
conduct. Dkt. No. 51 at 113–14. Texas Tech has therefore satisfied its evidentiary burden
at step two of the McDonnell Douglas framework. Just as Grodman fails to point to evidence
of a factual dispute in the “qualified individual” analysis (see supra, § 3.A.i), he does not
identify such a dispute with respect to the nondiscriminatory nature of his termination.

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There is no genuine factual dispute as to pretext.

Finally, there is a lack of evidence supporting Grodman’s argument that Texas
Tech’s stated reasons for terminating him were pretextual. A plaintiff bringing a retaliation
claim under the Rehabilitation Act must show that his “protected act was a but-for cause of
[his] termination.” Harmon, 158 F.4th at 608 (citing January v. City of Huntsville, 74 F.4th
646, 654 (5th Cir. 2023)). The but-for causation standard requires a showing that the
“unlawful retaliation would not have occurred in the absence of the alleged wrongful action
or actions of the employer.” Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 360 (2013).
Put another way, “even if a plaintiff’s protected conduct is a substantial element in a
defendant’s decision to terminate an employee, no liability for unlawful retaliation arises if
the employee would have been terminated even in the absence of the protected conduct.”
Long, 88 F.3d at 305 n.4.
Again, the record evidence of Grodman’s deficient patient care does much of the
work. Grodman must rebut each nondiscriminatory or nonretaliatory reason articulated by
Texas Tech, January, 74 F.4th at 654, and yet he does not offer more than a “scintilla” of
evidence to undercut Texas Tech’s stated reasons for his dismissal. Little, 37 F.3d at 1075.
Instead, Grodman focuses on other evidence that he says establishes the program’s
discriminatory motive and its unwillingness to comply with its own internal policies. See
Dkt. No. 50 at 32–36. For example, he points to Dr. Kaylani’s statement labeling him a
“dangerous resident,” and he emphasizes that the program suspended and terminated him
only days into the probationary period. Id. at 33–37 (quoting Dkt. No. 51 at 79). This
evidence does not move the ball. Even if the “dangerous resident” comment is some

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evidence of animus, Grodman still has not rebutted the justification for his termination: his
deficient patient care. See January, 74 F.4th at 654.
Grodman’s complaint about the disciplinary timeline is also misplaced. Although
his probation letter noted that the CCC would review his status in 90 days, it also explained
that “any unsafe patient practice or unprofessional incidents” during the probationary
period “may result in the recommendation that [he] be dismissed immediately from this
program,” a proviso that Grodman largely ignores. Dkt. No. 51 at 90. It was only after
Grodman made additional mistakes during the probationary period that the program
suspended him and began the march towards termination. See, e.g., Dkt. No. 45-1 at 433.
Thus, the disciplinary timeline does not evince a genuine factual dispute as to pretext.
4.

Conclusion
For the reasons above, no genuine dispute of material fact remains as to Grodman’s

claims under the Rehabilitation Act. Texas Tech is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
The Court grants Texas Tech’s motion for summary judgment (Dkt. No. 44). Because the
Court’s decision resolves all remaining claims in this matter and obviates the need for a trial,
Texas Tech’s Daubert motions (Dkt. Nos. 42; 43) are moot.
A final judgment will enter separately.
So entered on December 29, 2025.

JAMES WESLEY HENDRIX
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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