MOTION to Dismiss filed by Board of Regents of Texas Tech University System with Brief/Memorandum in Support. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit(s), # 2 Exhibit(s), # 3¶

Justice v. Texas Tech University, Regents of et al, No. 5:25-cv-00237-H (N.D. Tex.) · Dkt. 6 · 2026-01-23 · PDF

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT
COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT
OF TEXAS LUBBOCK DIVISION
HALEY JUSTICE
Plaintiff

§
§
§
v.
§
§
§
BOARD OF REGENTS OF TEXAS
TECH UNIVERSITY SYSTEM, for and §
on behalf of TEXAS TECH UNIVERSITY §
§
IN LUBBOCK, et. al.
§
Defendants.

Civil Action No. 5:25-cv-00237-H

DEFENDANT TEXAS TECH UNIVERSITY’S MOTION TO DISMISS PURSUANT
TO FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 12(b)(6)

Defendant Texas Tech University (“TTU” or “Defendant”), by and through its
undersigned counsel, files this Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6). In support thereof, Defendant would show the Court as follows:
I.

INTRODUCTION & DENIAL OF CLAIMS

TTU denies each and every allegation of liability or wrongdoing asserted by Plaintiff Haley
Justice (“Plaintiff or “Justice”). TTU specifically denies that it acted with deliberate indifference,
denies that it failed to respond to Plaintiff’s report appropriately, and denies that any action or
inaction by TTU caused Plaintiff injury.
While Plaintiff alleges a claim of deliberate indifference under Title IX of the Education
Amendments of 1972 (“Title IX”), her own pleadings demonstrate the opposite. Plaintiff’s
allegations, stripped of their conclusory labels, establish that TTU actively investigated her report,
engaged in an interactive grievance process, and secured a resolution. Plaintiff’s dissatisfaction
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with the specific outcome (an outcome requested on her own accord), of that process does not
equate to a violation of federal law. Because Plaintiff fails to plead facts plausible to support a claim
of deliberate indifference, her suit must be dismissed in its entirety.
II.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff filed the underlying suit against TTU for deliberate indifference under Title IX
based on its response to Plaintiff’s report of sexual assault by a fellow student. See generally, Dkt.
1. Plaintiff’s allegations stem from an incident that took place on or around November 5, 2023, on
Texas Tech University’s campus in Lubbock, Texas, between Plaintiff and a fellow student
(hereinafter, “Respondent”). Dkt. 1 ¶9. Plaintiff alleges that Respondent forcefully initiated sexual
contact with her, resulting in physical injuries and emotional distress. Dkt. 1 ¶13. The day after the
assault, Plaintiff reported it to TTU’s Title IX Office for Student Civil Rights and Sexual
Misconduct (“SCRSM”). Dkt. 1 ¶12. There, she met with Case Manager Meredith Holden. Dkt.
1 ¶12. Plaintiff also reported the assault to the Texas Tech Police Department, which began its own
investigation. Dkt. 1 ¶14.
In the months following, Plaintiff participated in several meetings with TTU’s SCRSM as
part of the formal grievance process. Dkt. 1 ¶¶20-21. The goal of the grievance process was to reach
a resolution that was satisfactory to Plaintiff and her well-being. Unfortunately, the nature of the
grievance process required Plaintiff to retell the details of the alleged assault multiple times. Dkt.
1 ¶21. The Informal Resolution process was explained to Plaintiff, and she agreed to engage in it. 1
Eventually, in June 2024, Plaintiff agreed to sign an Informal Resolution Agreement (“IR
Agreement”). Dkt. 1 ¶24. The terms of the IR Agreement provided Plaintiff with a no-contact

1

See Exhibit A.
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order regarding Respondent and required that Respondent receive training on sexual
misconduct/harassment, contribute $500.00 to Voice of Hope—a non-profit that supports
survivors of sexual violence—, and submit a reflective essay of at least 500 words on the
importance of consent. Dkt. 1 ¶¶24, 49. Ultimately, the terms of the Informal Resolution indicate
it was signed voluntarily to resolve the matter. 2
After Plaintiff signed the IR Agreement in June 2024, Plaintiff chose to leave TTU and
pursue her education in a remote setting. Dkt. 1 ¶49. Over one year later, she filed this suit, alleging
TTU was deliberately indifferent by improperly handling her report of the alleged assault by
assigning a biased investigator, unnecessarily dragging out the investigation, forcing her to sign an
IR Agreement despite her wishes, and failing to appropriately discipline Respondent. See generally,
Dkt. 1.
But as TTU will show, Plaintiff’s deliberate indifference claim is defeated by her own
admissions. Despite not achieving the desired result, Plaintiff cannot deny that TTU actively
investigated Plaintiff’s grievance by conducting interviews with key witnesses, holding meetings
with Plaintiff, and giving Plaintiff various options for finding a solution that best fit her needs.
Because these actions are antithetical to deliberate indifference, Plaintiff’s suit against TTU must
be dismissed in its entirety.

2

See Exhibit B.
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III.

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ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES

A. Standard of Review
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) governs motions to dismiss for failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted. 3 Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The “court accepts ‘all wellpleaded facts as true, viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.’” Martin K. Eby
Constr. Co. v. Dallas Area Rapid Transit, 369 F.3d 464, 467 (5th Cir.2004) (quoting Jones v.
Greninger, 188 F.3d 322, 324 (5th Cir. 1999)). To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6),
a plaintiff must plead sufficient facts to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft
v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “The
plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer
possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. Further, “[d]ismissal . . . is appropriate
where the plaintiff fails to allege ‘enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face’
and thus does not ‘raise a right to relief above the speculative level.’” Montoyta v. FedEx Ground
Package Sys., Inc., 614 F.3d 145, 148 (5th Cir. 2010) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).

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Generally, when “matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion
shall be treated as one for summary judgment.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b). But because TTU has attached the
Informal Resolution Notice (Exhibit A), Plaintiff’s signed IR Agreement (Exhibit B), and TTU System
Regulation 07.06.A (Title IX Sexual Misconduct) (Exhibit C) to their motions to dismiss, said documents
were also referred to in the Complaint (see generally, Dkt. 1) and these documents are central to Plaintiff’s
claims, the court may consider the documents without converting this motion into one for summary
judgment. See In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 495 F.3d 191, 205 (5th Cir. 2007).
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B. Plaintiff fails to state a claim against the Board of Regents.
Plaintiff styles her suit as one against “Board of Regents of Texas Tech University System,
for and on behalf of Texas Tech University in Lubbock.” See case style, Dkt. 1. She states: “The
Board of Regents of Texas Tech University System is the legal governing body responsible for
overseeing the Texas Tech University System.” Dkt. 1 ¶2. To the extent Plaintiff attempts to hold
the Board of Regents of Texas Tech University System liable as a separate defendant in this suit
based on this oversight role, she cannot do so. The Texas Supreme Court recently held that the
Board’s “general right to ‘direct[], manage[], and control’” the university under the Texas
Education Code is insufficient to demonstrate the Board’s liability for specific actions taken at the
component institution level. See Texas Tech Univ. Sys. v. Martinez, 691 S.W.3d 415, 422 (Tex.
2024).
To maintain a claim against the Board, a plaintiff must allege sufficient facts showing the
Board exercised “operational control” and took “direct action” against the plaintiff consistent
with that control. Id. at 421. A plaintiff cannot rely on the Board’s general governance powers to
impute liability; the petition must contain facts affirmatively demonstrating that the Board itself—
rather than the component university—controlled the specific decision or action causing the
alleged injury. Id. at 423; see also Glass v. Sul Ross State University, No. PE:22-CV-00014-DC-DF,
2023 WL 2028928, at *17 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 14, 2023) (dismissing student’s Title IX retaliation
claim against a board of regents for failing to show how student’s harm resulted from the board of
regents’ conduct). Because Plaintiff has not alleged facts showing the Board itself participated in
or controlled the specific conduct at issue, her claims against the Board must be dismissed.

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C. Plaintiff fails to state a claim for deliberate indifference against TTU.
Title IX states that “[n]o person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded
from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.” 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a). “A school district
that receives federal funds may be liable for student-on-student harassment if the district (1) had
actual knowledge of the harassment, (2) the harasser was under the district’s control, (3) the
harassment was based on the victim’s sex, (4) the harassment was so severe, pervasive, and
objectively offensive that it effectively bar[red] the victim’s access to an educational opportunity or
benefit, and (5) the district was deliberately indifferent to the harassment.” Sanches v. CarrolltonFarmers Branch Indep. Sch. Dist., 647 F.3d 156, 165 (5th Cir. 2011) (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted). “A damages remedy will not lie under Title IX unless an [appropriate] official . . .
has actual knowledge of discrimination in the recipient’s programs and fails adequately to respond.”
Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 290 (1998). For an educational institution to be
liable under Title IX, the institution’s “response must amount to deliberate indifference to
discrimination.” Id. Deliberate indifference is “a high bar, and neither negligence nor mere
unreasonableness is enough.” Sanches v. Carrollton-Farmers Branch Indep. Sch. Dist., 647 F.3d 156,
167 (5th Cir. 2011). Rather, a school acts with deliberate indifference when its “response to the
harassment or lack thereof is clearly unreasonable in light of the known circumstances.” Davis ex rel.
LaShonda D. v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 648 (1999). “A school can be deliberately
indifferent ‘before the fact’—i.e., the school has actual knowledge of a substantial risk that sexual
abuse or harassment will occur and does not respond reasonably to that risk—or ‘after the fact’—
i.e., after the school has knowledge of abuse or harassment, it does not respond reasonably, and the

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student suffers further harassment as a result.” J.T. v. Uplift Educ., 679 F. Supp. 3d 540, 549 (N.D.
Tex. 2023), aff’d, No. 23-10773, 2024 WL 5118486 (5th Cir. Dec. 16, 2024) (internal citations
omitted).
1. Post-reporting claim
Here, Plaintiff brings an “after the fact” or “post-reporting” claim of deliberate indifference,
alleging that TTU improperly handled her grievance complaint by assigning a biased investigator,
coercing Plaintiff into signing an IR Agreement against her wishes, and failing to adequately
discipline or sanction the alleged perpetrator of the assault. See generally, Dkt. 1. But none of these
actions rise to the level of deliberate indifference. Rather, the allegations show that TTU: (1)
immediately initiated an investigation; (2) assigned an investigator; (3) maintained communication
with Plaintiff throughout the process; (4) offered Plaintiff counseling services; (5) offered for Plaintiff
to move to a new dorm; and (6) initiated discipline against Respondent. Dkt. 1 ¶¶26-27, 29, 35-37.
Even taken as true that the investigation required Plaintiff to re-visit a traumatic experience, that the
assigned investigator did not meet Plaintiff’s expectations, that Plaintiff was unable to immediately
obtain counseling services, and that Respondent’s ultimate discipline did not reflect the exact
consequences Plaintiff had desired for him, they do not evince a school that is deliberately indifferent.
Dkt. 1 ¶¶57-60. To the contrary, Plaintiff’s Complaint is rife with admissions that TTU thoroughly
investigated her grievance. Dkt. 1 ¶¶26-27, 29, 35-37. Plaintiff interprets the seven months’ worth of
investigation as a way of showing TTU intentionally “dragged” the process out, when in reality,
Plaintiff neither mentions nor accounts for her own reluctance to engage in the Title IX process
during that time. It also shows that the SCRSM employees were committed to diligently gathering
facts and reviewing evidence. Even so, to the extent Plaintiff believes this process took longer than

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necessary, such actions would, at worst, amount to mere negligence, not deliberate indifference. See
Rost ex rel. K.C. v. Steamboat Springs RE–2 School District, 511 F.3d 1122 (10th Cir. 2008) (school’s
failure to follow policy by not interviewing alleged suspect and victim personally and instead relying
on law enforcement’s version of events amounted to negligence, not deliberate indifference); J.T.,
679 F. Supp. 3d at 557 (the fact that the school “might have done more or responded differently does
not, without more, establish deliberate indifference”); B.W. v. Career Tech. Ctr. of Lackawanna Cnty.,
422 F. Supp. 3d 859, 885 (M.D. Pa. 2019) (holding that even if the school’s remedial actions after
the students’ report of sexual abuse “were not as complete as plaintiffs allege they should have been
due to their failure to provide plaintiffs with counseling and other services, defendants’ remedial
actions . . . were not clearly unreasonable in light of the known circumstances.”); Davis, 526 U.S. at
648 (victims of peer harassment do not have a Title IX right to make a particular remedial demand);
Sanches, 647 F.3d at 170 (“Title IX does not require flawless investigations or perfect solutions.”);
but see Roe v. Cypress-Fairbanks Indep. Sch. Dist., 53 F.4th 334, 345 (5th Cir. 2022) (finding reasonable
jury could conclude that school district was deliberately indifferent where district claimed to have
investigated sexual assault yet possessed no documentation of investigation).
Additionally, many of Plaintiff’s allegations contain no more than mere speculation as to
TTU’s motives. For example, Plaintiff states: “TTU intentionally delayed the grievance procedure
against [Respondent] until SCRSM employees succeeded in coercing Plaintiff into signing the IR
Agreement, when TTU could have held a grievance hearing by the end of November 2023, as TTU
had collected sufficient evidence for a finding of responsibility by a preponderance of evidence by
that date.” Dkt. 1 ¶57. And that, “[w]hile TTU dragged out the grievance procedure, SCRSM
employees invested significant efforts into getting a proposed resolution from Plaintiff that was

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acceptable to [Respondent] in order to have the IR Agreement executed and avoid sanctioning
[Respondent].” Dkt. 1 ¶57. But Plaintiff would have no way of knowing whether TTU purposely
extended the length of the grievance process in order “delay” the process, nor does she explain or
infer how TTU delaying it would result in a favorable outcome for Respondent, or why TTU would
be interested in protecting Respondent in the first place. TTU’s actions in investigating Plaintiff’s
grievance should not be viewed through the lens of biased speculation. See Sanches, 647 F.3d at 16768 (noting that “courts should refrain from second-guessing the disciplinary decisions made by
school administrators”). Accordingly, these allegations should be disregarded, and Plaintiff’s postreporting claim should be dismissed for failure to state a claim. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
2. Heightened risk claim
To the extent Plaintiff’s pleadings allege a “heightened risk” claim, this too should fail. In
“heightened risk” cases, the inquiry revolves around whether the defendant-institution’s policy or
custom created a heightened risk of the alleged injury. Doe I on Behalf of Doe II v. Huntington Indep.
Sch. Dist., No. 9:19-CV-00133-ZJH, 2020 WL 10317505, at *5 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 5, 2020).
Here, Plaintiff cites to publicly-available statistics from TTU’s Title IX Office to support her
argument that TTU has “maintained a policy of deliberate indifference that creates a heightened risk
of sexual misconduct that was known or obvious.” Dkt. 1 ¶63. From there, she incorrectly assumes
that TTU has a high rate of sexual misconduct incidents and that many of them are unresolved, and
then makes the unsupported inference that TTU “refuses to investigate the vast majority of reported
incidents” and “punishes virtually no one.” Dkt. 1 ¶¶17-19. In making these incorrect assumptions,
Plaintiff asks the Court to infer a policy of deliberate indifference based on the number of
uninvestigated reports of sexual misconduct for the last three years. Dkt. 1 ¶¶17-19, fn. 2-4. This

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inference is implausible and contradicted by the regulatory framework under which TTU operates.
The term “unresolved” in the context of Title IX data does not mean “ignored.” Rather, cases
are frequently categorized as unresolved for procedural reasons mandated by law or policy—such
as lack of jurisdiction (e.g., conduct occurring outside the University’s education program or
activity) or complainant abandonment (where complainant chooses not to proceed with a formal
grievance or fails to comply with necessary investigative steps). 4 When a university closes a file
because it lacks jurisdiction or because a complainant withdraws, it is following the law, not acting
with indifference toward it. Plaintiff pleads no facts to show that these “uninvestigated” or
“unresolved” cases were actual instances of ignored abuse rather than procedural closures.
Similarly, Plaintiff’s cited statistics refer to reports of “sexual misconduct”—an extremely broad
term that cannot be analogized to the type of sexual assault allegedly experienced by Plaintiff.
Without this type of context, this raw data cannot support a plausible inference that TTU
maintains a policy of indifference. See Doe I v. Huntington Indep. Sch. Dist., 2020 WL 10317505, at
*5 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 5, 2020) (dismissing heightened risk claim where plaintiff failed to allege
concrete facts of an official policy of ignoring assault). Because Plaintiff’s “heightened risk” theory
relies solely on this mischaracterized data, the claim is no more than mere conjecture and
speculation and cannot sustain a heightened risk claim. See Roe v. Cypress-Fairbanks Indep. Sch. Dist.,
53 F.4th 334, 342 (5th Cir. 2022) (holding that “the District’s response to other incidents of sexual
harassment do not show the District’s knowledge of a substantial risk of Roe’s sexual assault.”); see
also Doe v. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist., 964 F.3d 351, 363 (5th Cir. 2020) (declining to consider whether
and to what extent the harassment of persons “other than the plaintiff” may constitute actual

4

See Exhibit C, § 8 (Grievance Process for Title IX Sexual Misconduct).
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knowledge of the plaintiff’s specific risk of Title IX harm); Doe I on Behalf of Doe II, 2020 WL
10317505 at *5 (finding that student did not allege enough concrete facts to establish that the school
had an official policy or custom of ignoring sexual assault as opposed to mere hazing and dismissing
remaining allegations that the school “perpetuat[ed] . . . a culture in which athletes were protected
from allegations of misconduct” as conclusory). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s heightened risk claim
should be dismissed for failure to state a claim. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
IV.

PRAYER

For the foregoing reasons, TTU respectfully requests that the Court dismiss Plaintiff’s
suit in its entirety and all other relief to which TTU may be justly entitled.

Dated: January 23, 2026

Respectfully Submitted.
KEN PAXTON
Attorney General of Texas
BRENT WEBSTER
First Assistant Attorney General
RALPH MOLINA
Deputy First Assistant Attorney General
AUSTIN KINGHORN
Deputy Attorney General for Civil Litigation
KIMBERLY GDULA
Chief, General Litigation Division
/s/ Sheaffer K. Fennessey
SHEAFFER K. FENNESSEY
Attorney-in-Charge
Texas Bar No. 24109859
Assistant Attorney General
General Litigation Division
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P.O. Box 12548, Capitol Station
Austin, Texas 78711-2548
P: 737-231-3926/ Fax (512) 320-0667
Shea.Fennessey@oag.texas.gov
ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT TTU

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of this document was filed electronically via
the Court’s CM/ECF system on January 23, 2026, causing electronic service upon all counsel of
record.
Austin Champion
Champion LLP
2200 Ross Avenue
Suite 4500W
Dallas, TX 75201
214-225-8880
Fax: 214-225-8881
Email: austin.champion@championllp.com
Thais Amaral Dourado
2200 Ross Avenue Suite 4500W
Dallas, TX 75201
214-225-0351
Email: thais.dourado@championllp.com
ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF
/s/ Sheaffer K. Fennessey
SHEAFFER K. FENNESSEY

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